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ARBITRATORS AND THE BOARD: A REVISED
RELATIONSHIP
ROBERT N. COVINGTONt
In a series of decisions released over the past twelve months,I the
National Labor Relations Board has significantly modified its policy on
deferral, a procedure under which the Board withholds full considera-
tion of a case in favor of detailed consideration through privately con-
stituted grievance-settlement processes created by collective bargaining
agreements. The thrust of these recent decisions is to restrict the situa-
tions in which the Board will defer. That the decisions were not unani-
mous reflects a strong division within the Board,2 as a result of which it
seems reasonably likely that as Board membership changes, and as new
cases with only slightly different fact patterns come before the Board,
there will be further reconsideration and development.
Although deferral cases have never constituted a major portion of
the Board's work, the deferral concept has attracted a great deal of at-
tention 3 and generated considerable disagreement. These doctrines
t Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University, and Member, The Labor Law Group; B.A. 1958,
Yale University; J.D. 1961, Vanderbilt University.
1. Douglas Aircraft Co., 234 N.L.R.B. No. 80, 97 L.R.R.M. 1242 (Jan. 31, 1978) (charge
under National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970); recognition of arbitral
decision denied); General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. No. 102, 94 L.R.R.M. 1483 (Mar. 16,
1977) (charge under § 8(a)(3); deferral request denied); Roy Robinson Chevrolet, 228 N.L.R.B.
No. 103, 94 L.R.R.M. 1474 (Mar. 16, 1977) (charge under National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(5),
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970); deferral for purpose of allowing arbitration granted); Filmation As-
socs., 227 N.L.R.B. No. 237, 94 L.R.R.M. 1470 (Jan. 1, 1977) (charge under National Labor Rela-
tions Act § 8(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1970); recognition of arbitral decision denied).
2. In most of these cases the deciding vote on whether to defer has been cast by former
Chairman Murphy, with Members Fanning (now Chairman) and Jenkins consistently voting
against deferral, and Members Walther and Penello voting in favor.
3. The literature is vast. A few of the valuable contributions are Atleson, Disciplinary Dis-
charges, Arbitration andNLRB Deference, 20 BUFFALO L. RE. 355 (1971); Getman, CollyerInsu-
lated Wire A Case of Misplaced Modesty, 49 IND. L.J. 57 (1973) (opposed to deferral generally);
Isaacson & Zifchak, Agency Deferral to Private Arbitration of Employment Disputes, 73 COLUM. L.
REv. 1382 (1973) (favoring board deferral); Schatzki, A Response to Professor Getman, 49 IND.
L.J. 76 (1973) (opposing deferral in individual rights cases, pre- and post-award; favoring it other-
wise); St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise
Wheel andIts Progeny, 75 MIcH. L. REv. 1137, 1157-59 (1977) (neutral); Teple, Deferral to Arbi-
tration: Implications of NLRB Policy, 29 ARB. J. 65 (1974) (generally favorable to deferral); Zim-
mer, Wiredfor Collyer" Rationalizing NLRB and Arbitration Jurisdiction, 48 IND. L.J. 141 (1973);
Zimmer, A Little Bit More on Collyer Insulated Wire, 49 IND. L.J. 80 (1973) (favoring board
deferral). In addition, deferral has been a recurrent subject of discussion in the proceedings of the
National Academy of Arbitrators.
At one time or another, virtually every position urged in this article has been suggested in this
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concern a significant interface between private and public forums. To
decide that an issue is more properly resolved by private processes is,
by definition, to decide that government should not intervene (or per-
haps it would be more proper to say that government should intervene
only in support of the private process). Such cases, therefore, stake out
the territorial limits of private as opposed to public decisionmaking and
serve an important symbolic function as vehicles for defining Board
philosophy on intervention. Moreover, such decisions are significant
for union and management strategists because they define the range of
issues that the parties may reasonably plan to settle through their own
grievance procedures. Finally, the deferral concepts are significant be-
cause they affect the scope of the responsibilities placed on the federal
courts by section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act4 as interpreted by the
Supreme Court in the Steelworkers Trilogy cases, United Steelworkers
v. American Manufacturing Co.,' and United Steelworkers v. Warrior &
6ulf Navigation Co.,6 and United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp.,land their progeny.' The Trilogy opinions charged federal
district courts to act in support of the arbitration process by requiring
that the parties resort to arbitration and by withholding consideration
of any case until arbitration procedures have been completed. 9 There-
fore, the practical importance of deferral from the perspective both of
the Board and of the parties, the recent restatement of positions by a
divided Board, and the general philosophic importance of determining
the proper scope of government intervention suggest that this is an ap-
propriate time to review the doctrines and their underlying rationales.
In a perceptive paper prepared for the Wingspread Conference,' 0
literature. Indeed, Professors Schatzki and Atleson have articulated conclusions similar to those
presented here in several respects, but for somewhat different reasons. The author does not share
their skepticism with respect to arbitrator abilities and concern for employee interest in associa-
tional freedom or with respect to whether regional offices of the Board and the Board itself can
make fair determinations of what has happened in arbitration.
4. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
5. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
6. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
7. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
8. See, e.g., General Warehousemen Local 767 v. Standard Brands, Inc., 560 F.2d 700 (5th
Cir. 1977) (divided court held arbitrator's award enforceable despite possibility that its rationale
might be regarded as inconsistent with NLRB certification; opinion reviews several major cases).
9. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 568; United Steelworkers v. War-
rior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 585; United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. at 596.
10. The Wingspread Conference was a conference sponsored by the American Arbitration
Association at Wingspread Center in Racine, Wisconsin in November 1975. The purpose of the
conference was to subject the future of labor arbitration in the United States to the scrutiny of
prominent legal scholars and practitioners.
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Professor Thomas G.S. Christensen asserted that any real and lasting
solution to the problems posed by the coexistence of arbitral and Board
forums must focus on determining when arbitration is clearly the better
and more appropriate forum, rather than on when arbitration is as ap-
propriate as Board procedures." Viewed in the abstract, Christensen's
assertion is patently open to question: if a private decisionmaker, such
as an arbitrator, is equally as desirable as a public decisionmaker, such
as the NLRB, why should Congress, which has the power to allocate
jurisdiction between the two competing forums, prefer the Board over
an arbitrator? Yet, that question misconceives the basis of Christensen's
assertion. Congress has chosen in this case to allocate jurisdiction to
both arbitrators and the Board, but has made only the Board accounta-
ble to Congress for the Board's exercise of that jurisdiction. 12 As a re-
sult, it is the Board, one of the "competitors" for jurisdiction, that must
account for not exercising the jurisdiction entrusted, or for unduly in-
terfering with the arbitral forum. In such a situation, the accountable
party must clearly prefer its own jurisdiction lest it be called to task for
undue inactivity and sloth.
Proceeding on the basis of Christensen's assertion, it is the thesis of
this article that the Board's current policy on when to defer to private
settlement processes has not always afforded those private processes the
area of operation that is appropriate for them, and at other times has
preferred those processses when it would have been better for the
Board to consider a case more fully. Nonetheless, in the recent deci-
sions there are the ingredients for a rational deferral policy, and a gen-
erally improved stance seems to have resulted. 13
11. Christensen, Private Judges-Public Rights.: The Role of Arbitration in the Enforcement of
the National Labor Relations Act, in AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, THE FUTURE OF
LABOR ARBITRATION IN AMERICA 49 (1976).
12. "Accountable" is used here in two senses. First, the Board's decisions are subject to
judicial review and are not self-enforcing. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f) (1970). Second, the Board is
obligated to report annually to the Congress and the President on the discharge of its duties. Id. §
153(c) (Supp. V 1975).
13. In suggesting that the criteria used by the Board to determine deferral are not totally
appropriate, it is essential to note that when one says "Board" one may at times be using that term
to refer to the regional offices, and to the General Counsel. Because the initial decision to pro-
ceed with a matter is ordinarily made at the regional office level, and because in practice that
decision is ordinarily final, the availability of relief from the Board is dependent on these deci-
sions. In addition to the criteria developed below, therefore, see text accompanying notes 28-71
infra, it is essential that any deferral doctrine be one that is capable of being consistently applied
by the various regional offices. Otherwise, the remedies available to parties would depend on the
fortuitous circumstance of where a given plant was located, a result not defensibleither in theory
or in practice. See Ordman, Arbitration and the NLRB-4 Second Look, in THE ARBITRATOR,
THE NLRB AND THE COURTS, 20 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS
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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
I. DEVELOPMENT OF PRESENT BOARD DOCTRINE
Because the deferral doctrines have received extensive attention in
articles and addresses, 4 it is fortunately unnecessary to examine each
of the decisions entered by the Board over the past twenty-three years.
In order to put the following discussion into perspective, however, it is
necessary to review a few of the most important and widely known
cases decided by the NLRB, and to relate these cases to a few of the
relevant judicial developments. In doing so, it is convenient to subdi-
vide the cases into those in which deferral followed resolution of a dis-
pute by contractual means and those in which the Board deferred
either before or during the private settlement process. Although there
are some obvious differences between the two situations, the underlying
policies are quite similar.
A. Post-Decision Deferral
Spielberg Manufacturing Co.,15 which was decided by the Board in
June 1955, involved a strike settlement agreement between the em-
ployer and the union in which it was decided that the issue of whether
four individual employees had engaged in strikeline misconduct would
be submitted to arbitration. The subsequent arbitration upheld dis-
charges for such misconduct. The four strikers charged in a complaint
before the Board that their dismissals violated section .8(a)(3) of the
National Labor Relations Act.' 6 The Board held that it would not af-
ford relief to the parties, but would instead recognize the arbitrator's
award. The Board relied upon three criteria in reaching its decision:
(1) the fairness and regularity of the private proceedings;' 7 (2) the
agreement of the parties to be bound by the arbitrator's decision; and
(3) the fact that the decision was not clearly repugnant to the purposes
and policies of the Act. The Board noted that it had not terminated its
jurisdiction over the arbitration process insofar as it had retained the
power to refuse to recognize the binding effect of any arbitration award
47 (1967) (remarks of General Counsel on existing doctrine); Workshop Sessions in id. at 173-202
(comments of Harvey Letter, Regional Attorney of NLRB).
14. See authorities cited in note 3 supra.
15. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
16. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970), provides: "It shall
be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure
of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership
in any labor organization ......
17. 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082. It is not required that the grievance procedure adhere to the for-
malities of courtroom procedure.
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that would in any sense be at odds with the statute the Board is empow-
ered to enforce. 18
Problems arise with each of these three criteria. As for the fair
and regular requirement, there will of course be instances of arbitrator
(or party) misconduct so serious that it is appropriate to disregard an
award;' 9 inasmuch as many grievance procedures do not require the
making of transcripts, however, determining unfairness or irregularity
will at times be difficult.20
The agreement of the parties to be bound raises questions of arbi-
trability, in the sense of determining whether the arbitrator stayed
within the bounds of the submission. While the matter is not free from
debate, it is generally supposed that this language is roughly the
equivalent of that in Enterprise Wheel, in which the Supreme Court
held that the "essence" of the arbitrator's decision must be based on the
contract.
2'
Whether an award is repugnant to the purposes and policies of the
Act has proved to be the most troublesome point. Some cases are quite
simple; if an arbitrator enters an award, compliance with which would
require a violation of the Act, then the Board obviously will not defer.
22
But what is to be done if a decision from a contract forum does not
specifically address a relevant statutory issue? In Electronic Reproduc-
tion Service Corp.,3 the Board was asked to defer to an award in a
section 8(a)(3) case even though the arbitrator had not addressed the
issue of whether certain discharged employees had been fired because
of their union activities. The union had chosen not to place the anti-
union animus evidence before the arbitrator, despite specific urging
that it do so. As the Board majority put it,
18. See NLRB v. Walt Disney Prods., 146 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 877
(1945). The case involved a charge that the employer discharged a worker because of his union
activities. The employer argued that the existence of an arbitral forum meant that this dispute
would be resolved peaceably and thus could not burden interstate commerce. The court rejected
the argument, reasoning that some arbitral awards might themselves act as a burden on com-
merce. Id. at 48.
19. See, e.g., Gateway Transp. Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1763 (1962) (failure to give adequate
notice).
20. Professor Atleson would apparently say "impossible." See Atleson, supra note 3, at 372-
73.
21. 363 U.S. at 597.
22. See the discussion in Buckstaff Co., 40 Lab. Arb. 833 (1963) (Young, Arb.). For the
reasons that might lead to such a result, see Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law andLabor
Arbitration, in THE ARBITRATOR, THE NLRB AND THE COURTS, supra note 13, at 14-19.
23. 213 N.L.R.B. 758 (1974).
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In this case. . . it appears plain that everyone knew at the arbitra-
tion hearing that there were issues of discrimination, and the Union
was urged by Respondents to present any testimony that it had with
respect to these issues. Yet while it appears that the Union did pres-
ent some unfair labor practice evidence with respect to Brown [one of
the discharged employees], it does not appear that it submitted any
such evidence with respect to [discharged employees] Bosch and
Grossman. Thus a forum was available, but no one introduced evi-
dence clearly relevant to the discrimination issue relating to two out
of the three grievants. We believe this kind of practice to be detri-
mental both to the arbitration process and to our own processes and
to be a means of furthering the very multiple litigation which
Spielberg and Cololer were designed to discourage.
Accordingly, we believe the better application of the underlying
principles of Collyer and Spielberg to be that we should give full
effect to arbitration awards dealing with discipline or discharge cases,
under Spielberg, except when unusual circumstances are shown
which demonstrate that there were bona fide reasons, other than a
mere desire on the part of one party to try the same set of facts before
two forums, which caused the failure to introduce such evidence at
the arbitration proceeding.24
While the Spielberg doctrine has been widely approved by the
courts, the refinement of that doctrine in Electronic Reproduction
Serpice has been rejected by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit and, more recently, by the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. In Banyard v. NLRB,25 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit stated that in addition to the three criteria
enunciated by the Board in Spielberg two other standards should be
met before deferral is proper: (1) the arbitral tribunal must have clearly
decided the unfair labor practice issue on which the Board is asked to
defer; and (2) the arbitral tribunal must have acted within its
competence.26
These two additional criteria have been criticized.27  First, they
increase the opportunity for forum shopping, which the Board sought
to counter in Electronic Reproduction.8 Second, a requirement that a
contract grievance procedure "clearly decide" an issue injects a need
for formality of consideration and decision that is inconsistent with the
24. I'd. at 761.
25. 505 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
26. Id. at 347.
27. See, e.g., 88 HARv. L. REv. 804 (1975).
28. 213 N.L.R.B. at 761.
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nature of many grievance systems.29 Third, the "clearly decided" re-
quirement ignores the possibility that full and satisfactory resolution of
a problem may be possible under a contract without consideration of
an unfair labor practice issue.30 Fourth, the "competence" requirement
either adds nothing of significance to the requirement that the dispute
be one that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration, or adds
considerations of fitness and qualification of the decisionmakers that
should ordinarily be reserved to the parties.3 1  Despite these argu-
ments, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided to adopt the
Banyard rationale in Stephenson v. NLRB 32 because of the desirability
of ensuring that protections specifically afforded by the National Labor
Relations Act be given full consideration by some forum.33
In addition to the concern over the criteria to be used in making a
post-decision deferral, other Spielberg area problems concern the situa-
tion in which the subject matter of the case in question is so peculiar in
nature that deferral is inappropriate. In a limited number of instances,
the Board has been called on to defer to arbitral decisions concerning
the scope of the bargaining unit, or related representation ques-
tions34-questions which for convenience may be thought of as arising
basically from section 935 of the Act rather than from Section 8.36 Fre-
quently, such controversies take the form of bipartite proceedings, even
29. Consider, for example, the situation in which both parties agree that an issue should be
avoided for personal reasons. In one case of which the writer is aware, an arbitrator was asked to
determine whether certain work rules were in effect at an industrial facility. When it became
clear that the decision might hinge on whether a certain foreman had done an adequate job of
communicating the rules, both parties suggested to the arbitrator that he omit this matter from his
opinion (although not from consideration) because to include it would cause distress to the fore-
man, who was about to retire due to ill health and was an exceedingly popular person who held
the confidence of both management and workers. The arbitrator willingly complied although the
resulting opinion was one he would prefer not to have reviewed by Board or court.
In some instances, of course, decisions "on the spot" without opinion are requested because
of the immediacy of a problem.
30. The easiest illustration is a discharge that the grievant claims was because of anti-union
animus but the employer claims was justified by the grievant's misconduct. If the arbitrator finds
the employer has failed to prove the misconduct, neither decision nor remedy would be altered by
exploring the anti-union animus issue.
31. The Banyardopinion uses "competence" primarily in ajurisdictional sense. In Stephen-
son v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1977), it is used to mean both jurisdiction and expertise. Id.
at 538 n.4.
32. Id. at 538.
33. Id. at 540.
34. See, e.g., Raley's, Inc., 143 N.L.R.B. 256 (1963). A recent illustration ofthe complexities
that can result in the courts from such proceedings is General Warehousemen Local 767 v. Stan-
dard Brands, 560 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1977).
35. National Labor Relations Act § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970).
36. Id. § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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though there are three interested parties-the employer and two com-
peting unions. Since it is unlikely that all possible issues can be effec-
tively presented in a two-party proceeding, it has been suggested that
Board application of the Spielberg deferral doctrine to representation
cases is inappropriate.
A similar problem arises when the subject matter concerns viola-
tions of section 8(a)(4)3" (or cases alleging violations with section
8(a)(4) overtones), an area in which the Board has a significant interest
in maintaining the availability and the integrity of its own processes.
Consequently, a majority of the Board decided in Filmation
Associates39 to withhold Spielberg deferral if a section 8(a)(4) charge is
brought. The Board majority in Filmation, Chairman Murphy and
Members Fanning and Jenkins, reached this decision even though the
arbitration opinion to which deferral was asked included findings that:
"(1) pursuit of grievances 'played no part in the decision of the Com-
pany to discharge the Grievant'; (2) the Grievant was not discharged
for union activity; and (3) 'the filing of the [unfair labor practice]
charge was not instrumental or even significant, as a reason for the
discharge of the Grievant.' "40
B. Deferral Prior to the Issuance of an Award
Deferral to a grievance-settlement process may be requested either
before that process has been set in motion, or while it is going forward.
The latter situation is ordinarily referred to as a Dubo case, from the
style of a leading Board opinion, Dubo Manufacturing Corp.4 1  In
Dubo, the charging parties were employees who had been threatened
by their employer with discharge because of their involvement in a
walkout in protest of the employer's refusal to permit an employee to
return from sick leave without first obtaining a medical certificate.42
The propriety of the walkout was being tested in court-ordered arbitra-
tion at the time this charge (together with others) came before the
37. See, e.g., Comment, The NLRB and Deference to Arbitration, 77 YALE L.J. 1191 (1968).
The bipartite nature of the forum does not preclude judicial compulsion to arbitrate. Carey v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 272 (1964).
38. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1970), provides: "It shall
be an unfair labor practice for an employer. . . (4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against
an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this subchapter."
39. 227 N.L.R.B. No. 237, 94 L.R.R.M. 1470 (Jan. 1, 1977).
40. Id. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1472.
41. 142 N.L.R.B. 431, 812 (1963), s.pplementaldecision, 148 N.L.R.B. 1114 (1964), enforced
353 F.2d 157 (6th Cir. 1965).
42. 148 N.L.R.B. 1114, 1115 (1964).
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Board.43 Inasmuch as the court order made it highly likely that the
arbitration would proceed on schedule, it is hardly surprising that the
Board decided to defer ultimate disposition of the matter until that pro-
ceeding closed. Dubo has also been interpreted to apply to situations
in which arbitration is continuing with the consent of both parties.'
Deferral prior to the commencement of grievance-settlement pro-
cedures has come to be known as a Collyer situation. Collyer Insulated
Wire4 5 involved charges of violations of section 8(a)(5)46 stemming
from unilateral changes in pay rates by an employer. The interpreta-
tion of two sections of the applicable collective agreement were critical
to the outcome, since the employer urged that those provisions specifi-
cally permitted the action taken.47  The Board voted three-to-two to
defer. The five members of the Board wrote four opinions. Chairman
Miller's opinion favoring deferral was joined by Member Kennedy.
They placed considerable emphasis on section 203(d) of the Taft-Hart-
ley amendments, 4 which declares the private-settlement procedure
agreed upon by the parties to be the desirable method of resolving dis-
putes arising out of the collective bargaining agreement, and on the
opinions of the United States Supreme Court in Carey v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp.49 and the Steelworkers Trilogy cases, in which the special
industrial expertise of arbitrators was praised.
Those congressional and judicial declarations led Chairman Miller
and Member Kennedy to conclude that the Board should seek to work
out an accommodation between the arbitral forum and the Board's
own tribunal. They stated that this type of controversy is one that cen-
ters more nearly on the collective bargaining agreement than on the
statutes, and that therefore the arbitral forum would be peculiarly ap-
propriate.5 ° Moreover, they noted that the parties had been engaged
in harmonious collective bargaining relationships for a considerable
period and that by retaining jurisdiction it would be possible to retain
control for purposes of determining whether the Spielberg criteria were
43. Id. at 1116.
44. See Office of the General Counsel, Memorandum 77-58, 95 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 152,
154 (1977).
45. 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
46. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970), provides: "It shall
be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title."
47. 192 N.L.R.B. at 837.
48. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970).
49. 375 U.S. 261 (1964).
50. 192 N.L.R.B. at 839.
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met.-5
Member Brown went further in a concurring opinion, stating that
"the labor industrial community views such procedures as an integral
part of collective bargaining. 52 This rationale would mean that to
engage in arbitration is to do no more than fulfill one's duty to bargain
collectively under sections 8(a)(5) or 8(b)(3) 53 of the statute. Members
Fanning and Jenkins dissented in separate opinions. They pointed out
that the contract in question called for arbitration to commence within
certain time limits that had expired. They also objected to arbitration
deferral on the grounds that section 10(a) 54 of the Act forbids the Board
to "cede" its jurisdiction in this fashion. Finally, they noted that defer-
ral is likely to be urged by regional offices very strenuously, so that a
charge reaching a Board panel is probably one that the charging party
feels quite strongly is not suited to the arbitral forum.5
Member Brown stated in his opinion in Collyer Insulated Wire
that he would be ready to defer in 8(a)(3) cases even before the arbitra-
tion process had begun, 56 but the Board did not endorse that point of
view until its decision in National Radio Co.5 ' The charging party in
NationalRadio alleged that he had been discharged because of his ac-
tive pursuit of grievances on behalf of members of the union.58 The
employer, on the other hand, alleged that it was quite willing for the
discharged employee to engage in grievance handling. For a variety of
reasons, however, the employer felt it was desirable to know the em-
ployee's whereabouts while at work, and therefore the employer insti-
tuted a requirement that the employee notify the employer before
going away from his normal work station for grievance-handling pur-
poses.59 The employee was discharged for persistent violations of this
notice requirement after receiving several warnings. The majority
opinion, announcing that deferral would be utilized in 8(a)(3) cases,
heavily emphasized the same factors that had been involved in Colyer:
51. Id. at 842-43.
52. Id. at 844 (Brown concurring). The extent to which arbitration is a "judicial" procedure
or a "negotiating" procedure is a matter of continuing debate. See Hepburn & Loiseaux, Nature
of the .4rbitration Process, 10 VAND. L. REv. 657 (1957); Wirtz, Arbitration is a Verb in ARBITRA-
TION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, 24 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRA-
TORS 30 (1971) (much of which deals with interest rather than rights arbitration).
53. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1970).
54. Id. § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a).
55. 192 N.L.R.B. at 847, 849 (Fanning, dissenting); id. at 854 (Jenkins, dissenting).
56. Id. at 845 (Brown, concurring).
57. 198 N.L.R.B. 527 (1972).
58. Id. at 527.
59. Id. at 538-39.
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the congressional and judicial favoring of arbitration; the saving of
time and energy to the Board; that disputes of this sort are rooted in the
contract as well as the statute; and that adequate control of pre-award
deferral could be maintained by retaining jurisdiction for the limited
purpose of ascertaining whether Spielberg criteria had been met.
In an extended dissent, Members Fanning and Jenkins added to
their prior objections one that was to prove important when Board per-
sonnel changed. They noted that the rights involved in 8(a)(3) cases
are individual rights, while the signatories to the collective bargaining
agreement are not the individual employees but rather the union and
the employer.6" They also objected on the ground that the deferral
decisions of the Board had led to a situation in which the parties "may
contract themselves out of the act to any extent they choose" 61-a re-
sult the Congress surely would not have intended. Moreover, they ar-
gued, these decisions were placing substantial costs on private parties
that they would not have had to bear if the matter had been handled
entirely by Board personnel.62 They also raised the question whether
arbitrators would be willing to include considerations of employees'
section 763 rights in making "good cause" discharge determinations. 64
National Radio remained the controlling case from 1972 until the
Board's 1977 decisions, Roy Robinson Chevrolet6 and General Ameri-
can Transportation Corp.,66 in which deferral was urged by the em-
ployer respondent. The outcome was to defer in Roy Robinson, an
8(a)(5) case, but not to defer in General American Transportation, an
8(a)(3) case. Members Walther and Penello favored deferral in both
cases, arguing essentially the same points previously made in Collyer
and National Radio.67 Members Fanning and Jenkins would have re-
fused to defer in both cases for the reasons set forth in their prior deci-
sions and also because the deferral doctrine had not resulted in the
60. Id. at 533 (Fanning & Jenkins, dissenting).
61. Id. at 534.
62. Id. at 535.
63. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
64. 198 N.L.R.B. at 534 (Fanning & Jenkins, dissenting).
65. 228 N.L.R.B. No. 103, 94 L.R.R.M. 1474 (Mar. 16, 1977).
66. 228 N.L.R.B. No. 102, 94 L.R.R.M. 1483 (Mar. 16, 1977).
67. The Walther-Penello dissent in GeneralAmerican Transportation quotes extensively from
the Brown opinion in Collyer and the majority opinion in National Radio on the importance of
arbitration in general and the extent of congressional endorsement of arbitration. Id. at -, 94
L.R.R.M. at 1490, 1493 (Penello & Walther, dissenting). They add to this references to approval
of deferral by the courts of appeals, id. at-, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1490-92, and summarize the results
of an internal study of how deferral has affiected the work of the Board, id. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at
1494.
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efficiencies envisioned by the Collyer majority.6 8 The swing vote was
that of Chairman Murphy, who agreed with Members Walther and
Penello that deferral itself is not inappropriate under the National La-
bor Relations Act, but who stated that the arguments favoring deferral
in 8(a)(3) cases are not sufficiently strong to overcome the
disadvantages.69
In GeneralAmerican Transportation, Chairman Murphy gave five
reasons for refusing to defer in 8(a)(3) cases. First, the determination
of whether section 8(a)(3) has been violated depends upon whether the
conduct complained of was unlawfully motivated, an issue that the
Board is particularly expert in handling, and that arbitrators are "not
qualified to decide."70 Second, the right protected by section 8(a)(3) is
the right to full freedom of association, a right which is a "cornerstone
of all Section 7 rights."' 7 1 Because of its fundamental importance, such
a right cannot "lawfully be reduced or eliminated either by the em-
ployer, the union, or by both."' 72 Third, the rights protected by section
8(a)(3) are "public rights" that "must be protected by the Board in its
public capacity." 73 Fourth, the rights created by a collective bargaining
agreement are essentially related to the employer and the union, and
the contract is therefore one "in which the employee has virtually no
role to play." 74  Fifth, the individual employee cannot compel the
union "to process the grievance through arbitration if the grievance is
resolved against the employee. ' 75 The union's decision may be based
on considerations of cost or other factors not related to whether an em-
ployee's section 7 rights have been invaded.
On the other hand, Chairman Murphy stated that in the typical
8(a)(5) case, the essential question is ordinarily whether employer con-
duct is permitted by the collective bargaining agreement. Because inter-
pretation of the agreement is a field in which arbitrators have special
competence, a policy of deferral would seem to be appropriate.76
68. National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. at 535 (Fanning & Jenkins, dissenting); see Collyer
Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. at 843.
69. General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1486-87.
70. Id. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1486 n.11.
71. Id. at-, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1487.
72. Id. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1487-88.
73. Id. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1488.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1486.
[Vol. 57
ARBITRATORS AND THE BOARD
With all due respect to Chairman Murphy, it must be acknowl-
edged that because the factual settings in these two cases were not
consistent with her position the reasoning at times seems strained and
unduly abstract. The charging party in General American
Transportation alleged that he had been laid off because of his involve-
ment while a union steward in filing and pursuing OSHA complaints.
The company's response was that the employee was laid off because of
lack of work. The applicable collective agreement provided that the
employer would not exercise its right to lay off employees "for the pur-
poses of discrimination against any employee."'7 7 The grievance-arbi-
tration provision of the agreement was broadly worded. Thus,
Chairman Murphy adopted her position that 8(a)(3) cases should not
be subject to deferral in a setting that could hardly have been more
representative of the type of case arbitrators handle most often.
In Roy Robinson, the charge under section 8(a)(5) stemmed from
the decision of the employer to subcontract its body shop operation.78
This decision was made under a collective agreement without specific
language on subcontracting.79 Moreover, the decision was announced
four days after a heated exchange between the employer's president
and a body shop employee who was engaged in what the employer
regarded as unfair picket line activity. 0 Thus, while the charge was
framed in terms of section 8(a)(5), there were clear overtones of anti-
union animus.
In all events, pending review by the courts, the present situation is
that a majority consisting of Members Fanning and Jenkins and
Chairman Murphy will decline to defer in cases alleging violations of
sections 8(a)(l), s1 8(a)(3), 8(b)(1)(A)s2 and 8(b)(2), s3 while Member
Penello will continue to vote to defer in those cases, as well as to vote
with Chairman Murphy to defer in cases brought under sections 8(a)(5)
77. Id. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1489.
78. 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1474.
79. Id.
80. Id. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1478-79.
81. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
82. Id. § 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A).
83. Id. § 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2). The likelihood of deferral in cases brought under
sections other than 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5) has never been great. As a result, this article pays scant
attention to such cases. It is unlikely that arbitration will be available in any 8(b) cases since few
grievance procedures provide for filing of grievances against unions. Violations of no-strike
agreements would be more likely to involve arbitrator-court coordination than arbitrator-Board
coordination.
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and 8(b)(3). The attitude of Member Truesdale is yet to be
determined.
II. CRITERIA FOR DEFERRAL DECISIONS
It is relatively easy to distill from these major cases the criteria that
the members of the Board agree should be applied in deciding whether
to defer in a particular case: (1) congressional intent with respect to the
allocation of decisionmaking responsibilities should be followed; (2)
the more competent forum should be utilized, whenever feasible, to de-
termine a dispute; (3) the forum that will give the more complete relief
should be preferred; (4) effective counsel and investigative support
should be made available to the parties; (5) costs of dispute resolution
should be minimized and should be borne by the appropriate parties;
(6) the content of the normative doctrine applied by arbitral and Board
forums should be as congruent as possible; (7) conflicts of interest be-
tween a union and its members should not be permitted to interfere
with the members' exercise of section 7 rights; (8) whatever deferral
doctrines are developed should be sufficiently certain of application so
that the parties may predict with confidence whether such a doctrine
will be applicable to them; and (9) deferral must not impair the integ-
rity and credibility of Board actions. The members of the Board agree
on the appropriateness of virtually all of these criteria; on the applica-
tion of these same criteria, however, the Board members differ
substantially.8 4
84. The following brief chart indicates the points in Filmation, Roy Robinson and General
American Transportation at which the members of the Board address these values.
Factor 1: Fanning, Jenkins: General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at
1484; Murphy: id. at-, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1487; Penello, Walther: id. at-, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1490-91.
Factor 2: Fanning, Jenkins: Filmation Assocs., 227 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1471; Mur-
phy: General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1486-87; Penello, Walther.
id. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1491.
Factor 3: Fanning, Jenkins: Roy Robinson Chevrolet, 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1479.
Factor 4: Murphy: General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1489;
Penello, Walther: Filmation Assocs., 227 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1473.
Factor 5: Fanning, Jenkins: Roy Robinson Chevrolet, 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1480;
Murphy: General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1488. Penello, Walther.
id. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1493.
Factor 6: Fanning, Jenkins: Roy Robinson Chevrolet, 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1479-
80; Murphy: General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. at--, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1486 n. 11; Penello,
Walther: Roy Robinson Chevrolet, 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1475.
Factor 7: Murphy: General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1488-89;
Penello, Walther id. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1493-94.
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A. Congressional Intent
Each side in the deferral controversy can point to statutory lan-
guage favoring its position. In support of their position in opposition
to deferral Members Fanning and Jenkins consistently refer to lan-
guage in section 10(a) of the National Labor Relations Act providing
that the Board's power to prevent any person from engaging in any
unfair labor practice "shall not be affected by any other means of ad-
justment or prevention that has been or may be established by agree-
ment, law or otherwise." 5 Members Penello and Walther, on the
other hand, consider their position in favor of deferral supported by
language in section 203(d) of Taft-Hartley86 providing that "[f]inal ad-
justment by a method agreed upon by the parties is. . . the desirable
method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application
or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement." To
add to the confusion, the legislative history of these provisions is less
than clear-cut. Section 10(a) was amended by the Taft-Hartley Act to
eliminate prior language that stated NLRB jurisdiction should be "ex-
clusive." 87 This may have been done, however, only to permit NLRB
cession of jurisdiction to state labor relations boards.88 At the same
time, the conference committee that produced the final version of Taft-
Hartley rejected a Senate-passed provision that would have made-
refusal to carry out the terms of a collective bargaining agreement arbi-
tration provision an unfair labor practice. 89
The result of all of this is that the Congress placed its stamp of
approval on two different forums, arbitrators and the Board. The
courts have recognized this by approving the application by the Board
of its Spielberg 9o and Collyer91 doctrines. In giving their approval to
Factor 8: Fanning, Jenkins: id. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1485-86; Penello, Walther. Filmation As-
socs., 227 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1473-74.
Factor 9: Fanning, Jenkins: id. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1471; Penello, Walther: id. at -, 94
L.R.R.M. at 1473.
85. National Labor Relations Act § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970).
86. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970).
87. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970), as amended by Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley)
Act of 1947, ch. 120, § 10(a), 61 Stat. 136.
88. See H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23, reprinted in [1947] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1135, 1158-59.
89. The Coliermajority relied very little on legislative history. See 192 N.L.R.B. at 840 n.7.
It is interesting that Senator Wagner's original proposal for a labor relations act envisioned that
the Board would have broad jurisdiction as an arbitral forum as well as its other powers. See s.
2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 206 (1934), reprinted in I NLRB LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NA-
TIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT, 1935, at 10-11 (1949).
90. See Filmation Assocs., 227 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1473 n.8.
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Board deferral doctrines, however, the courts have never indicated that
it would be proper to use similar theories, such as election of
remedies. 92  In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,93 in which the
Supreme Court rejected arguments favoring deferral by the courts to
arbitral awards in Title V11 94 cases, the Court took the opportunity to
discuss the arguably analogous NLRB situation. The Court empha-
sized that the use by the parties of arbitration does not preclude later
Board consideration of the case.95 The present state of the case law
would thus seem to be that the Board is entitled to develop its own
deferral doctrines, so long as the effect of those doctrines is not to re-
move from the Board significant areas of responsibility entrusted to it
by the Congress.
On the whole, this outcome seems reasonable. Though it is
doubtful that the Congress in 1947 could appreciate the detailed
problems of overlapping forums, it is quite clear that those engaged in
drafting the Taft-Hartley Act were fully aware of the significance of
arbitration as a dispute-settlement mechanism, as well as of the possi-
bility that the jurisdiction conferred on the federal district courts by
section 301 might require those courts to interpret provisions of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act without prior specific guidance from the
Board. Nonetheless, they were willing to enact a statute that did not
fully resolve these potential conflicts. Ultimately, it must be assumed
that Congress anticipated that the courts, with their supervisory power
over the Board, would work out the conflicts in some fashion.
B. Competence of Forum
The question of when arbitration may provide a more competent 96
91. See Roy Robinson Chevrolet, 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1475 nn.4 & 5.
92. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947) (arguing against
this approach).
93. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
94. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V
1975).
95. 415 U.S. at 50.
96. The question of how competent arbitrators are, as a group, in conducting hearings, mak-
ing findings of fact, interpreting contracts, and applying principles of law, is the subject of fierce
debate. The polar views are usually thought to be those expressed in the Steelworkers Trilogy,
praising arbitral expertise, and those expressed by Judge Hays in P. HAYS, LABOR ARBITRTIOrN:
A DISSENTING VIEW (1966). The problem is not one of measuring absolute competence, of
course, but of measuring the competence of arbitrators relative to that of NLRB administrative
law judges and other groups of decisionmakers. It is impossible to evaluate arbitrator ability with
real confidence because few arbitrators submit opinions for publication and because arbitrators
often restrict their practice geographically or by case load. In addition, other factors besides
ability are taken into consideration by parties in selecting an arbitrator. It has therefore been
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forum than the Board is not an easy one. An initial problem is
whether the standards for selection of arbitrators in the United States
are sufficient to guarantee even minimal competence. One of the pri-
mary concerns expressed by the Supreme Court in Gardner-Denver was
that arbitrators are less likely to be competent in applying Title VII
doctrine than in applying the "law of the shop."'97 Concern has often
been expressed that many arbitrators in the labor relations field are not
law trained and thus might fail to grasp some of the subtleties of legal
positions taken by the parties. In addition to this concern, it must be
added that not all arbitration procedures call for the participation of a
neutral third party. There are quite a number of bipartite grievance
committees in existence,98 whose members are drawn from manage-
ment and union personnel at the plant in which the dispute originated.
The question can be raised whether it is appropriate for the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board to get into the business of evaluating in-
dividual competence, a difficult and no doubt distasteful task, or
whether it should simply leave the matter to the parties. The prefera-
ble view, surely, is that the Board should not ignore the competence
issue. If there is to be deferral, one result is that rights conferred on
individuals by the Congress will be significantly affected by the deci-
sions of arbitrators. Since the Board has been given the primary task
of defending those rights,99 it is preferable not to defer unless there are
impossible to develop a consensus even about what credentials should be viewed as appropriate.
See Aaron, ShouldArbitrators Be Licensed or "'Professionalized" in ARBITRATION 1976, 29 PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 152 (1976).
Consequently, discussions of arbitrator competence tend to have an a priori flavor. Each of
us tends to generalize from a few observations, and to bring to these discussions deep-seated per-
sonal evaluations that are unlikely to be changed. It is patently obvious that the writer's personal
experience (a very limited one) has made him optimistic about the quality of the arbitration expe-
rience. Personal optimism, however, seems too slight a foundation for assertions of expertise, so
one falls back on two other bases for urging that arbitral ability to handle these issues is adequate:
(1) The market. If arbitrators were as incompetent as some have asserted, the demand for their
services would not have increased so markedly over the past 30 years. (2) The nature of the issues.
The issue of anti-union animus raises the gravest objections to arbitral disposition, and yet this is
the very sort of issue that we entrust regularly in civil litigation to nonexpert lay judges-the
members ofjuries. This latter argument, however, is very weak because in the Board process there
are experienced decisionmakers available for just such questions. Thus in the final analysis one
in the writer's position relies most heavily on the simple proposition that the customers of arbitra-
tion keep coming back for more; it is reasonable to suppose, therefore, that arbitral competence is
at least sufficient for the tasks entrusted to that forum by the parties.
97. 415 U.S. at 57.
98. See generally I ABA SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW, 1971 PROCEEDINGS 42 (1972)
(remarks of William J. Curtin). That this device poses tougher problems in Spielberg cases than
those posed by the neutral third party device is indicated by the Banyard and Stephenson cases,
both of which involved essentially bipartite procedures. But see Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S.
335 (1964).
99. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970).
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minimal guarantees of competence present. It is fortunate that objec-
tive criteria are available that can be used by the Board to avoid ad hoc
individual competence determinations. Membership in the National
Academy of Arbitrators and appointment to panels of the American
Arbitration Association and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service are not guarantees of spectacular brilliance. These appoint-
ments are made, however, with sufficient care that it would be appro-
priate for the Board to regard these credentials as strong indicators of
minimal competence.' 00
Guaranteeing minimal competence is only the beginning. For the
reasons noted earlier, deferral should be indulged in only when arbitra-
tion is likely to be the more competent forum. This is likely to be the
case at least in respect of those types of judgments that arbitrators have
been most frequently called upon to make. Experience, in other
words, is the most significant reason for assuming competence. This is
the basis of Chairman Murphy's conclusion in Roy Robinson that
deferral is appropriate in the typical 8(a)(5) case.' 0' Inherently, such
cases involve the question whether contract language permits manage-
ment to act as it did, and since the "name of the game" for arbitrators is
interpreting contract language, surely this is the type of matter arbitra-
tors are most competent to decide. This competence would be pecu-
liarly important in making a deferral decision since the bulk of the
Board's own work does not involve contract interpretation.
When one turns to the 8(a)(3) discipline and discharge cases, it is
more difficult to concur with Chairman Murphy's assessment of arbi-
trator competence. She indicates considerable skepticism regarding
the ability of arbitrators to decide issues of anti-union animus and in
particular to detect pretext.'0 2 Discipline and discharge cases, how-
ever, are those most commonly submitted to arbitration. 0 3 Among the
arguments most frequently put forward in such cases is that other em-
100. See generally Aaron, supra note 96, at 152.
101. 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1477. This viewpoint is further buttressed because
the issue involved in Roy Robinson-management's privilege to subcontract-is one of the issues
the Court in the Steelworkers Trilogy indicated is within the peculiar competence of arbitrators.
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 584.
102. General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1486 n.l 1, 1489. Chair-
man Murphy states that arbitrators are not "qualified" to decide the anti-union animus issue be-
cause in order to be qualified one must be specifically charged to consider the issue, and the only
persons so charged are the administrative law judges serving in the NLRB. This argument has
the same obvious circularity as the "public rights" argument and thus fails to add significantly to
the strength of her opinion. She also argues that contract language may at times preclude the
arbitrator from considering discrimination issues-a more telling point.
103. See 0. PHELPS, DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE IN THE UNIONIZED FIRM 18 (1959).
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ployees who have given the company the same cause for disciplinary
action have not received the same treatment as that meted out in the
grievant's case. 104 To assist them in determining the real reason for the
discharge or for the disciplinary action, arbitrators have developed a
special order of presentation of such cases: the employer is required to
present its case first, thereby giving the union a greater opportunity to
analyze and refute the employer's "just cause" argument by showing
that this just cause is not the true reason for the company's conduct.
10 5
Thus, pretext is very common grist for the arbitrator's mill, and Chair-
man Murphy's skepticism with regard to arbitrator competence on this
issue seems ill founded.
This is not the end of the matter, however, for in determining
whether arbitration is likely to be the more competent forum it is neces-
sary to look at the level of expertness likely to be available at the
Board. On this score, Chairman Murphy's position seems more rea-
sonable. The Board considers a significant number of anti-union ani-
mus cases each year, many of them involving disciplinary action and
discharges. In formulating its doctrine, the Board has developed an
extensive jurisprudence with regard to what constitutes "cause" for dis-
charge under the language of section 10(c),' 0 6 and in this respect, it is
clear that Board competence is likely to be at least equal to that pos-
sessed by arbitrators. Inasmuch as deferral in a Collyer situation is
appropriate only when arbitration is likely to be the more fitting tribu-
nal, these discipline and discharge cases would not seem to be the
proper ones in which to defer.
That conclusion is still subject to challenge, however, because of
an additional aspect of the competence determination that is essentially
jurisdictional in nature. Consider the case of X, an employee dis-
charged allegedly because of insubordination. At a Board hearing it is
demonstrated that X is not a union official, nor particularly involved in
union affairs, and that the act of insubordination involved was Xs fail-
104. See Summers, Arbitration of Unjust Dismissal.'A Preliminary Proposal, in AMERICAN AR-
BITRATION ASSOCIATION, THE FUTURE OF LABOR ARBITRATION IN AMERICA 159, 163-64 (1976).
105. The procedure is so widespread that it is mentioned in manuals for use by nonlawyers.
See R. COULSON, LABOR ARBITRATION-WHAT You NEED TO KNOW 61 (2d ed. 1978). More
conventional is PROBLEMS OF PROOF IN ARBITRATION, 19 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 221, 229 (1967).
106. National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970). See generally DEVELOP-
ING LABOR LAwl22-32 (C. Morris ed. 1971). Board precedent has developed to the point of
distinguishing between the types of employer conduct that may be termed "inherently destructive"
of employee rights and the types that have only a mildly adverse effect, with different standards of
proof with respect to employer motivation for each of the categories. See NLRB v. Bogart
Sportswear Co., 485 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1973).
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ure to return to his post after arguing with his supervisor about the
accuracy of the wall clock that allegedly signaled the end of a coffee
break. There is no proof of anti-union motivation. In such a circum-
stance, no Board remedy would be appropriate.1"7 In an arbitral fo-
rum, however, it would be appropriate under most collective
agreements for the union to show that similar acts by other employees
with virtually identical disciplinary records resulted in nothing more
than a written reprimand or a brief suspension. It is possible in such a
situation that the arbitrator would order modification of the discharge
to conform more nearly to the discipline meted out in the past for simi-
lar rule infractions.' 0 It is thus quite possible that in discipline and
discharge cases the arbitral forum can consider a much broader range
of issues than are appropriate for the Board, and it is therefore likely
that arbitration would provide finality of decision.
If one is willing to accept the argument that ability to weigh evi-
dence with respect to pretext is very similar in both forums, and if it is
correct to say that in such cases the arbitral forum is the more likely to
consider the fullest range of issues in the case, then arbitration is argua-
bly the more competent forum. In saying this, it has been assumed
that arbitrators are willing to consider anti-union animus in connection
with the good cause issue. 10 9 Quite obviously, there are collective
agreements that would forbid an arbitrator to do this;" 10 in such cases,
virtually no argument can be made that deferral would be appropriate.
C. Efficacy of Remedy
Neither arbitral awards nor Board orders are self-enforcing. It is
for the party who wishes to have the award or order enforced to get a
court order if the opposing party does not voluntarily comply. Board
and arbitral remedies are also similar in that each forum has demon-
strated considerable ingenuity in seeking to tailor remedies to the facts
107. See Borkin Packing Co., 208 N.L.R.B. 280 (1974).
108. See generally E. TEPLE, ARBITRATION AS A METHOD OF RESOLVING DISPUTES 125-43
(1972); R. SMITH, L. MERRIFIELD & D. ROTHSCHILD, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND ARBITRA-
TION 412-19 (1970); Summers, supra note 104, at 163-64.
109. The most recent BNA survey indicates that about half of the current major collective
agreements forbid employer discrimination based on union membership. 2 COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING NEGOTIATIONS & CONT. (BNA) § 95, at 5-6 (1975). In addition, some arbitrators would
doubtless imply such an obligation from recognition or union security clauses.
110. For example, there are agreements (and submissions) that charge the arbitrator to con-
sider only the question whether an employee did in fact violate a work rule.
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of individual cases.' This is not to say that the remedial powers are
identical. Particularly significant is the ability of the parties to a col-
lective agreement to agree to specific limits on the scope of arbitral
power."12 For example, in some agreements an arbitrator is forbidden
to modify the severity of discipline once it has been found that just
cause for the imposition of discipline is present. Any limitation of this
sort on the scope of relief available through the privately constituted
system makes deferral by the Board less appropriate.
The usual remedy provided by arbitration and by the Board for
wrongful discharge is the same: reinstatement with back pay. The dif-
ferences, when they are present, do not provide a consistent basis for
preference. First, an arbitrator (in the absence of a clause restricting
arbitral power such as that described above) is generally thought to
have the power to require that the disciplinary action imposed be mod-
ified to "make the punishment fit the crime" in light of all the circum-
stances of the case, and not simply anti-union animus. Because Board
decisions on 8(a)(3) "liability" issues tend to be "all-or-nothing," the
Board's remedy powers tend to be used in an "all-or-nothing" way.
This is a clear advantage in favor of utilizing the arbitral forum. On
the other hand, in a case in which management asserts frivolous de-
fenses to a charge of wrongful conduct, the Board has the advantage
because it may order reimbursement of litigation expenses." 3 Ordina-
rily, the costs of arbitration are specifically allocated under the provi-
sions of the collective agreement (at times being evenly divided, at
times being imposed more heavily on the losing party), and it would be
inappropriate for an arbitrator to deviate from the specifics of such an
agreement. In addition, there is available to the Board the privilege of
seeking preliminary injunctive relief under section 10(j)'1 4 in order to
maintain the status quo during the conduct of Board proceedings. Par-
ties may undoubtedly seek similar relief pending arbitration under sec-
tion 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act,' I' but it is unclear whether essentially
similar doctrines would be applied in the two situations." 6 While the
conclusion is not totally clear, it would appear that neither forum has
111. See D. McDOWELL & K. HUHN, NLRB REMEDIES FOR UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES 81-
121 (1976); Note, Discharge in the 'Law" ofArbitration, 20 VAND. L. REv. 81, 123-39 (1966).
112. See Fleming, Arbitrators and the Remedy Power, 48 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1205 (1962).
113. Tiidee Prods., Inc. v. International Union of Electrical Workers, 426 F.2d 1243, 1253 n.15
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970).
114. National Labor Relations Act § 10(j), 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1970). The Board has invoked
this preliminary injunctive remedy only rarely.
115. See Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 253 (1970).
116. For example, to what extent is the General Counsel's decision to seek an injunction enti-
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an advantage over the other as far as remedies in discharge and disci-
plinary action cases are concerned.
When one turns from discipline and discharge cases to cases deal-
ing with unilateral change without prior bargaining, conduct that is
governed by section 8(a)(5) of the Act, the situation is even more diffi-
cult to assess. In the event either an arbitrator or the Board finds that
an employer has improperly instituted unilateral change, such as dis-
continuing a bonus or subcontracting work previously done by employ-
ees in the bargaining unit, the typical remedies (other than the
bargaining order) are quite similar. They are likely to include an or-
der to pay the bonus, or to pay back wages lost because of an improper
denial of work, plus restoration of conditions prior to the unilateral
change.1 7  Such a restoration order will be denied if practical circum-
stances, such as the removal of equipment, preclude reasonable compli-
ance."18  In this connection, the Board's power to seek preliminary
injunctive relief, such as maintenance of the status quo, may be of im-
portance in a limited number of situations. The effectiveness of Board
remedies for 8(a)(5) violations, however, has often been questioned be-
cause there is a good deal of uncertainty regarding the circumstances
under which the Board will do more than order the parties back to the
bargaining table."19
On the other hand, whether arbitrators can require the parties to
bargain is also subject to question. In practice, it is quite clear that
arbitrators often encourage the parties to bargain. Those arbitrators
who accept the philosophy of arbitration espoused by such prominent
figures as Professor Aaron 20 think of this as one of their major tasks.
The techniques available for this purpose are numerous. One can indi-
cate the possibility of an adverse decision at a time prior to issuance of
an opinion, with the expectation that this will lead the parties back to
tied to a deference that would be denied private parties? See Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc.,
515 F.2d 1185, 1192-93 (5th Cir. 1975).
117. See, e.g., Leeds & Northrup Co. v. NLRB, 391 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1968).
118. See, e.g., Avila Group, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 633, 642-43 (1975).
119. There has thus far been little commentary on the Board's "new" retroactive bargaining
order, enunciated in Trading Port, Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 298 (1975). See Drug Package, Inc. v.
NLRB, 570 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1978) (retroactive remedy inappropriate because of ruling on
8(a)(5) issue and because respondent's conduct predated Trading Port).
There are proposals now before the Congress to provide stronger 8(a)(5) remedies. See H.R.
8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
See also Ex-Cell-O Corp. v. NLRB, 449 F.2d 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Tiidee Prods.,
Inc., 426 F.2d 1243 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970), decision on remand, 196 N.L.R.B.
158 (1972).
120. Aaron, Some Procedural Problems in Arbitration, 10 VAND. L. REv. 733 (1957).
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the negotiating table. During the process of arbitration, issues may at
times be clarified in such a way that the parties can detect possibilities
of agreement that did not emerge at the early stages of a dispute-settle-
ment process. Thus, it can be said with confidence that arbitration, even
on the judicial model, can encourage bargaining.
The question still remains, however, whether an arbitrator has the
formal power to require bargaining. At times, this power is clearly
provided for in the collective agreement. For example, an arbitrator
may be called on to enforce provisions of a wage-reopening clause that
envisions bargaining; but in the absence of a specific clause of this sort,
the likelihood of a bargaining order type of award is minimal. Profes-
sor Getman has suggested that a duty to bargain may be implied from
the typical union-recognition clause,'' but this position has been chal-
lenged vigorously within the arbitral community 2' and is probably en-
dorsed by only a small number of arbitrators. The present situation is,
therefore, one in which a bargaining order award is unlikely to emerge
from the arbitral forum. This brings one back to the question whether
the bargaining order, which simply requires the parties to do that
which the statute requires in the first place, has any real force. So long
as one restricts the universe of inquiry in this matter to Board pro-
ceedings alone, the bargaining order certainly seems a toothless rem-
edy.' 23 Yet, that perspective is unduly restrictive. When the Board
seeks enforcement of its bargaining orders, it does so in the United
States Courts of Appeals, and if enforcement is granted, further-
noncompliance constitutes contempt.'2 4  The use of the contempt
power has not been widespread in 8(a)(5) cases, but at least some courts
of appeals have demonstrated an inclination to take this power very
seriously.' 5 These courts are willing to impose quite significant con-
tempt sanctions for failures to bargain in good faith, sanctions that in-
clude both heavy fines and the possibility of incarceration. 2 6 When
one thinks of bargaining orders not simply as redeclarations of statu-
tory duties, but rather as the prelude to contempt proceedings, their
121. Ralph Rogers & Co., 48 Lab. Arb. 40 (1966) (Getman, Arb.).
122. See, e.g., 18 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 120-29 (1965);
Christensen, supra note 11, at 80-81.
123. There may, of course, be ancillary relief as well, such as an order to pay a Christmas
bonus that was unilaterally discontinued. See DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 391-92, 857-58 (C. Morris
ed. 1971).
124. See D. McDOWELL & K. HUHN, supra note 111, at 245-.46, 245 n.10.
125. See the discussion of NLRB v. Schill Steel Prods., 480 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1973), in D.
McDOWELL & K. HUHN, supra note 111, at 247-48.
126. D. McDOWELL & K. HUHN, supra note Ill, at 246-48.
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significance as Board remedies looms larger, and the existence of such
powers in the Board forum makes deferral seem much less attractive.
The preceding paragraphs make out a substantial case that the
Board's remedy powers in connection with 8(a)(5) cases may well be
more complete than those available under collective agreements
through arbitration. This ignores, however, the realities of what the
Board can actually manage to do, given the limitations of its staff and
the great demands on its time. In practice, 10(j) injunctions are rarely
sought. 127 They tend to be limited to the most extreme and important
cases, cases in which deferral is unlikely in the first place. Likewise, one
rarely sees contempt orders sought with respect to 8(a)(5) orders. The
potential advantages thus available through Board procedures are sel-
dom useful to the parties.
On the other side is the great advantage of the arbitral fo-
rum-speed. Arbitrators do not always proceed at the same pace; some
are extremely dilatory. For the most part, however, it is clear that the
arbitral forum provides a decision with considerably greater speed than
does the Board. 2 ' This is of tremendous importance in both 8(a)(3)
and 8(a)(5) cases. If an 8(a)(3) case involves discharge, for example,
not only is an employee out of work without income, but potential back
pay liability for the employer is also accruing. In 8(a)(5) cases, the
greater the time between institution of the charge and the final deci-
sion, the greater the chances for changes to occur that will make a res-
toration of circumstances order inappropriate. So long as arbitration
can provide a significant advantage in terms of quickness of decision,
this advantage appears to be sufficient to outweigh the theoretical avail-
ability of more substantial remedies through the Board, particularly
since in practice these remedies are rarely used.
127. See NLRB General Counsel's Report on Injunction Proceedings, 90 LAB. REL. REP.
(BNA) 12 (1975).
128. Given the variety and volume of grievance procedures in the United States, generaliza-
tions are difficult, and in recent years there have been complaints about delay and technicality in
the arbitral forum. See, e.g., Killingsworth, 4rbitration Then andNow, in LABOR ARBITRATION AT
THE QUARTER-CENTURY MARK, 25 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRA-
TORS 11 (1973). The best known response of arbitrators is the development of new expedited
procedures, which apparently have achieved greater speed and reduced costs per case, although
not without drawbacks. See Murray & Griffin, ExpeditedArbitration of Discharge Cases, 31 ARB.
J. 263 (1976). Probably the most important determinant of quickness of decision is the choice of
arbitrator. An arbitrator with a heavy case load must fit a new submission into an already
crowded schedule, while a less well-known arbitrator is more likely to be available promptly.
Thus, speed of arbitration is dependent on the maintenance of a substantial pool of arbitrators
acceptable to parties. The efforts of the National Academy to develop such a pool may be fol-
lowed by reading the committee reports in the annual meeting proceedings.
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D. Effectiveness of Counsel and Investigative Support
While the respondent generally will be represented by privately
retained counsel in either forum, the charging party has the option of
allowing Board personnel from the General Counsel's office to repre-
sent his interests in Board actions. Therefore, with respect to the issue
of effectiveness of counsel and investigative support, it is necessary to
focus on the representation of the charging party. Because charging
parties retain rights to participate in Board proceedings12 9 and to con-
tinue as participants represented by private counsel even when the case
has reached the courts, 130 it is theoretically possible for an aggrieved
party to regard the availability of NLRB counsel and staff as an "add-
on." Because of costs, however, this privilege of intervention is used
sparingly, and the charging parties are usually content to allow Board
personnel from the General Counsel's office to take the leading role in
the great majority of Board actions. Thus the real question is whether
one forum affords the charging party more effective representation than
the other.
The principal advantages of having Board personnel are the bene-
fits associated with an efficiently functioning bureaucracy. The stand-
ards of minimal competence are high, and there are devices in place to
provide quality control, so that if Board personnel begin to falter in
their work, they will be reassigned or replaced. 31 The advantages do
not include individual superiority of available counsel: virtually any
arbitrator can point to a number of cases in which the representation
provided an aggrieved employee by the union could not have been bet-
ter. And it is arguable that the advantages of Board personnel are not
as great in 8(a)(5) cases involving interpretation of the collective agree-
ment. In that situation, union personnel engaged in the arbitration
process are likely to have participated in the original negotiation, and
thus are more able to develop effective lines of questioning and argu-
ment concerning the nature of the bargaining history involved. 132 No
129. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970); 29 C.F.R. § 101.10 (1977).
130. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1970).
131. This does not imply that all Board agents are equally capable or that they have applied
Board doctrine consistently in all cases. See Report of the Chairman's Task Force, 93 LAB. REL.
REP. (BNA) 221, recommendations 14 & 42 (1976). Nonetheless, the general tone of that report is
favorable toward Board personnel. The General Counsel has been vigorous in seeking critical
comments concerning poor handling of cases, and the training programs for Board staff have
recently been reinvigorated. See 1 ABA SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW, 1977 PROCEED-
INGS 63-64 (1977).
132. See, e.g., Liebes, Preparing the Case for Arbitration, in THE ARBITRATOR, THE NLRB
AND THE COURTS, supra note 13, at 359, 361-62.
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matter how able the Board attorney assigned to such cases is, it is diffi-
cult for him or her to appreciate the nuances, subtleties and personal
interplay of the bargaining room.
E Allocation and Minimization of Costs
Opponents of deferral have long recognized that cost is one of
their strongest arguments. 133 Why, they ask, should it be necessary for
either employers, employees or unions to pay private counsel and staff
to vindicate their rights under the National Labor Relations Act when
Congress has established a publicly funded office whose principal task
is to vindicate those same rights? Professor Schatzki's response that
the National Labor Relations Act was not enacted for the purpose of
protecting "feeble" unions seems a bit facetious. 134 He and others,
however, have suggested stronger rationales. First, it is appropriate to
infer from union negotiation of arbitration clauses that unions are will-
ing to bear arbitration expenses. 135 Second, because arbitration offers
the opportunity for a more rapid vindication of union or employee
rights, it is quite possible that by choosing arbitration the union may
realize a gain through the continued accumulation of dues. Moreover,
to the extent that rights grounded in the collective agreement are iden-
tical in content to those provided by the statute, the rights involved are
both "private" and "public," and our society has always expected those
who seek the vindication of private rights to pay their own litigation
expenses. 136
There is one argument, however, that may well provide a rationale
for selecting a particular body of fact situations for deferral. In its
1974 opinion in NLRB v. Magnavox Co.,' 37 the United States Supreme
Court singled out freedom of association as the keystone interest pro-
tected by the National Labor Relations Act.' 38 So fundamental is this
right that it may not be waived by the bargaining representative (al-
though the mode of exercise is subject both to employer regulation and
bargaining). 139 Because section 8(a)(3) is aimed at protecting employ-
ees against employer conduct engaged in for the purpose of infringing
133. See Getman, supra note 3.
134. See Schatzki, supra note 3, at 78.
135. See General Am. Transp., 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1493 (Penello & Walther,
dissenting).
136. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. v. Wilderness Soe'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
137. 415 U.S. 322 (1974).
138. Id. at 325-26.
139. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1970) (union-security clauses).
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freedom of association, it is obvious that 8(a)(3) cases are pivotal to the
maintenance of our statutory labor law scheme and, therefore, the use
of public funds to protect this interest is peculiarly appropriate.
While section 8(a)(5) rights are also "public" by definition, it has
long been recognized that the right to bargain on a nonassociational-
freedom issue can be waived by the bargaining agent, 4 ' although such
waiver will not be inferred lightly. 41 Thus, there is less reason to jus-
tify the expenditure of public funds. In addition, a failure-to-bargain
charge is likely to involve the job protections available to a large
number of union members and, therefore, the union will be more will-
ing to use its own limited funds in pursuing a resolution through
arbitration.
That a public law-enforcing agency may decide to leave certain
matters to enforcement at private cost is hardly novel. Torts are often
crimes (conversion, trespass to chattels and battery, for instance) as are
some breaches of contract (bad checks given in fulfillment of a promise
to pay). That a district attorney would choose to pay scant attention to
check collection cases, in part because other avenues of redress are
open to the victims, and to devote the time saved to the trial of felony
cases, would not shock most of us. We would be shocked, however, if
the same district attorney justified a refusal to try a person indicted for
murder on the grounds that the victim's family can sue the miscreant in
tort. The analogy is not perfect-this is not to suggest that refusals to
bargain are misdemeanors and discriminatory discharges felonies-but
it does point up that enacting a right or duty into statute, thereby mak-
ing it public, provides the agent charged with enforcement only modest
guidance about what priority to assign that enforcement activity as
compared to others. It also illustrates that the availability of a roughly
parallel private remedy does not necessarily justify a low priority. The
opportunity is created to choose to use taxpayer funds to vindicate a
right when that right is made public, but the choice itself is not
compelled.
F. Congruence of Normative Doctrine
There are at least two reasons why the Board should not defer to
the arbitral forum when the content of doctrine applied in the arbitral
forum may not protect the same interests as those protected by Board
140. Ador Corp., 150 N.L.R.B. 1658 (1965).
141. C & C Plywood Corp., 148 N.L.R.B. 414, enforcement denied, 351 F.2d 224 (9th Cir.
1965), rev'd, 385 U.S. 421 (1967).
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doctrine. The first reason applies both to Spielberg and to Collyer sit-
uations. If arbitral forum doctrine does not afford protection to those
rights that are guaranteed by section 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act, and the Board defers either to an arbitral decision or to the arbitral
process, then in effect the charging party, whether employer, union or
employee, has been deprived of rights guaranteed by public law as a
result of an act of the agency charged with protecting those rights.
This is clearly not to be countenanced.
The second reason applies primarily to Cololer cases. As a practi-
cal matter, if the Board stays its hand in favor of a forum that will
apply a different doctrine, it encourages both forum shopping and bi-
furcation of proceedings. Given a choice of two routes, a party will
obviously seek to follow the route that leads to application of the more
favorable doctrine. Likewise, in the event the forum deferred to under
Collyer fails to apply Board doctrine, there is a greater reason to be-
lieve that the disfavored party will treat the arbitration process cava-
lierly and that he will then urge the Board to allow him a "second bite
of the apple."' 142 Thus, a second proceeding will be necessary and the
advantage of arbitral speed and efficiency will be lost.
In some cases it is very easy to determine whether the content of
arbitral doctrine and the content of Board doctrine will be essentially
the same in a given case. In a Spielberg situation in which the griev-
ance-settlement procedure has resulted in a written opinion that sets
forth the reasons for the particular outcome, it should be fairly simple
to tell whether those reasons are congruent with Board doctrine, or
whether they are instead "repugnant to the policies and purposes of the
Act." ' 43 Even in Coller cases, this determination is sometimes quite
simple. The collective agreement may enunciate doctrine that incor-
porates public law by reference, or on the other hand, it may adopt
language that on its face is violative of the policies of the Act. The
appropriateness of deferral is thus made clear by looking to the agree-
ment (or possibly to the submission), which spells out the doctrine to be
applied by the arbitrator. In most Coller cases, however, absolute
certainty of doctrinal congruence is not likely to exist. The discharge
clause of the agreement may stipulate that an employee can be dis-
charged only for "cause," but from the context in which the term ap-
pears, it may not be possible to determine its precise meaning. Thus,
142. See Getman, supra note 3, at 68 (deferring even though inconsistency of doctrine will
result in bifurcation of proceedings).
143. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082.
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the question whether the "cause" referred to is identical to that referred
to in section 10(c) of the Act is unanswerable at the preliminary stage
when the Board must make its deferral decision.
To complicate the matter further, arbitrators are sharply divided
on the question of the extent to which it is appropriate for them to
apply principles of public law in reaching their decisions.144 This divi-
sion is in part due to the Supreme Court's position that in order to be
proper an arbitral decision must be drawn from the agreement. But
agreements are construed by some from the perspective of implying
congruence between agreement and public law whenever possible,
14 5
and by others from the perspective of regarding the two as entirely sep-
arate and not to be applied together unless explicitly called for.
146
This lack of unanimity within the arbitral community, coupled with the
fact that arbitration is not a precedent-oriented system, means that
Board deferral decisions, made as they are at preliminary stages of the
dispute-settlement process, must be rendered on the basis of a reason-
able prediction of whether arbitral doctrine and Board doctrine are
likely to coincide.
In the 8(a)(3) area, the likelihood of coincidence is very strong. In
GeneralAmerican Transportation, Members Fanning and Jenkins theo-
rized that an arbitrator might well find that "good cause" for discharge
exists without delving further into the matter to determine whether that
cause was actually only a pretext for the employer's true motivation.
147
In the absence of empirical research, it is not possible to demonstrate
the truth or falsity of their conclusion,148 but it would appear to be
unjustified. As noted in the section on competence, discharge cases are
144. For an overview of this problem, see DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN ARBI-
TRATION, 21 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 42-82 (1968). This
includes comments by four of the strongest arbitrators: Richard Mittenthall, Bernard Meltzer,
Robert Howlett and Theodore St. Antoine.
145. Howlett, The Role of Law in 4rbitration: 4 Reprise, in id. at 64-75.
146. Meltzer, The Role ofLaw in 4rbitratio." 4 ReJoinder, in id. at 58-64.
147. 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1485.
148. See Getman, supra note 3, at 58 n.6. Getman notes that a study of 2,300 arbitration
cases indicated 338 involved potential National Labor Relations Act issues, but that only 54 of
these 338 indicated on their face consideration of these issues. This does not, however, prove the
point that arbitrators are inhospitable to proof of anti-union animus. If, for example, I handled a
case in which the "cause" for discharge was tardiness and the grievant's proof indicated that no
other employee had ever received more than a reprimand for each misconduct, and also presented
proof that a foreman had spoken harshly of the dischargee's activities as a union steward, it is
quite likely I would dispose of the case on the basis that the employer lacked "just cause" for
discharge and say nothing at all about the possibility of anti-union animus. This would not indi-
cate lack of interest on my part, but only that having reached a conclusion that would result in an
award wholly favorable to the alleged discriminatee I saw no reason to go further with the griev-
ant's other proof and thus have to charge the parties with additional time.
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among the most commonly submitted to arbitrators, and judgments
with respect to the motivation of an employer are inherent in a large
number of these situations. Few arbitrators would be unwilling to ac-
cept a union demonstration that an alleged cause for discharge was ac-
tually a mask for encouraging or discouraging union membership, and
virtually none would regard this motivation as "just cause. ' 149
This general identity between Board doctrine and normal arbitral
doctrine with respect to "cause" should not be allowed to obscure one
area in which there may be a significant difference between the two
forums. The NLRB has developed a concept that certain management
conduct is so "inherently destructive" of bargaining agent rights that
the conduct violates section 8(a)(1) without regard to the question of
anti-union animus ordinarily involved under section 8(a)(3). 150 An ex-
ample would be the dismissal of all union officials from the employ of
the company because of their insistence in taking time off from work
for the purpose of representing the members. This "inherently destruc-
tive" concept has no general equivalent in most collective agreements
and, therefore, no corollary in ordinary arbitral doctrine. It is possible
that such a doctrine could be implied from the typical union recogni-
tion clause,' 51 but it is doubtful that arbitrators would be eager to ac-
cept this implication. Even if the doctrine were to develop, however, it
seems improbable that it would parallel Board doctrine. This group of
"inherently destructive" cases, therefore, is not an apt one for deferral.
With respect to management's power to make unilateral changes,
in one sense Board doctrine and arbitral doctrine can be very simi-
lar.'52 If an arbitrator finds that the collective agreement gives man-
agement the right to make a certain decision independently, either
because the union has waived any rights to object or because such a
decision is a matter of inherent management rights, then a grievance
would be disallowed. If the Board were to find that management is
empowered by the contract to make a certain decision without prior
consultation, either because the matter is specifically reserved to man-
agement or because the union has waived its rights to bargain further
149. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 646-47 & n.170 (3d ed.
1973).
150. See Oberer, The Scienter Factor in Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) ofthe Labor Act: OfBalancing
Hostile Motive, Dogs and Tails, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 491 (1967) (best statement of rationale for doc-
trine). The concept was approved by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, 388
U.S. 26, 34-35 (1967).
151. See Ralph Rogers & Co., 48 Lab. Arb. 40 (1966) (Getman, Arb.).
152. The question is explored well in Isaacson & Zifehak, supra note 3.
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on the issue, then an 8(a)(5) charge would be dismissed. The two com-
peting forums, however, have not always been so in step with one an-
other.153  While it is impossible to find arbitral unanimity on virtually
any subject, prior to the Board's 1971 decision in General Motors
Corp. 1
54 the bulk of arbitral opinion probably would have allowed a
broader sphere for employer decision than the Board would have. 5
To some extent, this may still be the case, but not to nearly so large a
degree.'
56
But what of waiver? On this there remains a divergence of opin-
ion within the arbitration community that defies precise definition.
Most arbitrators will consider the same types of evidence, bargaining
history, past practice of the parties and so on, 57 but the willingness of
individual arbitrators to infer restrictions on management's freedom of
action varies substantially. 158  On the other hand, Board doctrine has
become quite firm in this area. Waiver, in the Board's view, is not
readily to be implied from "zipper" clauses, 159 or from the absence of
specific restrictions on management in the agreement.'
60
The difference between Board attitudes and the attitudes of some
arbitrators with regard to "zipper" clauses and related issues is of less
significance in those situations in which there has been a long history of
continuous bargaining. In such cases, histories of past practice and
153. See generally MANAGEMENT RIGHTS AND THE ARBITRATION PROCESS, 9 PROCEEDINGS
OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS (1956) (virtually all arbitrator positions on ques-
tion are put forward).
154. 191 N.L.R.B. 951 (1971), enforced sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
155. See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962), enforced, 322 F.2d 411
(D.C. Cir. 1963), aff'd, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
156. In General Motors, the Board refused to disavow Fibreboard, but applied it in such a
fashion that the restrictions on management's freedom of action became much less significant.
157. See generally F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 149, at 252-95.
158. See Killingsworth, Management Rights Revisited, in ARBITRATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE,
22 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 1 (1970).
159. A "zipper" clause purports to relieve management of the duty to bargain collectively with
respect to any subject not covered in the agreement. See Radioear Corp., 214 N.L.R.B. 362
(1974).
160. See Herman, Administrative Deference to Private Arbitration, in LABOR LAW DEVELOP-
MENTS 1975, at 335, 338-39 (1975). Herman discusses the curious history of Radioear Corp., 199
N.L.R.B. 1161 (1972), deferred to arbitration, 61 Lab. Arb. 709 (1973) (May, Arb.), complaint
dismissed, 214 N.L.R.B. 362 (1974), which may have indicated an acknowledgment by the Board
of error in its prior views of lack of finality of bargaining agreements. It is, however, difficult to
develop a wholly satisfying conclusion because the second Board decision was reached on a 2-1-2
basis.
While some arbitrators are willing to embrace similar doctrines, others have been constantly
critical of the Board's perspective ever since its decision in Jacob Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214
(1951).
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testimony with respect to the content of negotiations can often resolve
questions that otherwise might have to be determined on the basis of an
abstract philosophy of inherent management rights. If, for example,
an employer has been paying the same Christmas bonus for ten years
and then suddenly discontinues it without notification to the union or
discussion of the matter, it is highly likely that arbitral and Board deci-
sions on management privilege would be identical. When, on the
other hand, a bonus that has been maintained outside a bargaining re-
lationship and that has varied substantially in amounts over the years is
discontinued during the first year of an employer's initial collective
agreement, the likelihood of arbitrator and Board divergence is much
greater. All of this suggests that with respect to 8(a)(5) issues, the pres-
ence or absence of such a history may be a primary reason for granting
or denying deferral.' 6 '
G Conflict of Interests
In the arbitral forum, a grievant's case is ordinarily pleaded and
proved by his union. Quite obviously, if there is a significant diver-
gence of interests between grievant and union, and if the interest of the
grievant is in protecting a contract right identical to a statutory right,
then deferral is inappropriate. For this reason, one should not permit
deferral in 8(b)(1)(A) or 8(b)(2) cases involving charges brought by in-
dividual employees.' 62
But what of divergences that alone are not sufficient to justify an
8(b)(2) charge, but that may nevertheless be evident in an 8(a)(3) or
8(a)(5) type of case? Consider, for example, the situation in which the
union has made an objective, good faith determination that the best
interests of most employees would be served by acquiescing silently in
a unilateral management change of production process, the impact of
which is the dismissal of a small group of skilled workers. In one
sense, the union's decision not to take the matter to arbitration seri-
ously prejudices the interests of the employees who stand to lose their
jobs. On the other hand, if the matter goes to the Board as an 8(a)(5)
161. See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. at 842.
162. It is, of course, possible that in rare instances an employee may be provided counsel by an
employer or third party in an arbitration proceeding involving such an issue, and that a grievance
procedure clause may be broad enough to permit thorough consideration of the issue by an arbi-
trator. Even so, the difficulties likely to be encountered by a grievant at odds with his or her
union are substantial. Obtaining willing witnesses, uncovering evidence of past practice and-
"sizing up" one's opponent are tasks more likely to be performed well by an experienced union
steward than by an individual grievant.
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case, and the Board enters a bargaining order, it is likely that the union
will be willing, in good faith and without violating its duty of fair rep-
resentation, to bargain away the very same jobs. How, then, can one
say this possible divergence has prejudiced the dismissed employees?16
3
For one thing, the dismissed employees have lost all opportunity
to benefit through pre-arbitration negotiations. While arbitration itself
tends to be a "yes" or "no" affair, the pre-arbitration bargaining negoti-
ations ordinarily offer a variety of alternatives, some of which might
serve the interests of the majority union well, while also restricting the
privileges of the affected minority less severely than the decision devel-
oped unilaterally by management. Thus, if the union chooses to ac-
quiesce in management's unilateral action rather than to force the
matter to arbitration, the detriment is not merely loss of the status quo,
but also loss of the opportunity to engage in the process of negotiation,
which may present the only real possibility of satisfactorily accommo-
dating the interests of all parties concerned.
The Board's remedy in such a case is most likely to be a bargain-
ing order (with or without a direction to restore the status quo plus
back pay).'" But in a situation of this sort, the more important aspect
of the grievance dispute-settlement mechanism is not arbitration, but
the pre-arbitration conferences between union and management, for
those conferences are likely to be on a negotiation model rather than a
judicial model. Thus the Board can encourage the parties to engage in
pre-arbitration negotiation simply by deferring to the arbitral forum.
Indeed, perhaps one may wonder whether Board deferral in 8(a)(5) or
8(b)(3) cases should not be premised on an understanding that the par-
ties will engage not only in arbitration but also in the last step of their
grievance process prior to arbitration.
With respect to 8(a)(3) discipline and discharge cases, the signifi-
cance of conflicts of interests is clear, and the potential for harm to the
individual is great. After all, discipline imposed on a single individual
within a large unit, and for reasons that are not likely to be shared by
any significant number of fellow workers, competes for union attention
with other grievances that may affect larger numbers of workers. Since
resources are likely to be limited, it would not be unnatural for the
163. The same argument can be applied to the situation in which the union has pursued the
matter with less than full vigor.
164. The arbitral award, if any, is likely to be a direction to restore the status quo and compen-
sate for lost wages. Additionally, with regard to Board action, the chances of dismissal are good,
and, therefore, there may be no remedy at all.
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union to prefer the multi-member grievance over the one-member
grievance. It is possible, therefore, that the union's decision with re-
spect to priorities may be sufficiently rational to avoid breaching the
duty of fair representation, and thus there may be no independent judi-
cial remedy available.65
I Certainly of Application
There are three principal reasons for wishing a deferral doctrine to
be clear and certain in application. First, parties who can feel reason-
ably certain that an arbitral decision would have no impact on a Board
decision, and who realize that a charge before the Board is very likely,
can save themselves the time and expense of arbitration. Second, par-
ties who know that an arbitral decision is likely to have an impact on
Board treatment of a case are more likely to present their arguments
and evidence as effectively as possible in the arbitration, thus giving the
process the greatest chance to succeed in putting the matter to rest.
Third, clarity of Board doctrine makes it easier for the regional offices
to treat parties uniformly so that the accident of geography does not
unduly affect outcomes.66
On the surface, the outcome of General American Transportation
and Roy Robinson would appear to provide much greater certainty
with respect to whether the Board would defer in a given case: in an
8(a)(5) case, deferral is available as a possibility; in an 8(a)(3) case, it is
not. Unfortunately things are rarely so simple. As Chairman Murphy
herself intimates, there are quite a number of situations in which
8(a)(3) charges can readily be added to charges under section 8(a)(5).1
67
Indeed, the Roy Robinson case is one in which it is possible to infer
from the sequence of events that the decision to subcontract, and thus
to discharge, may in part have been motivated by a desire to discourage
certain types of union activity, such as the picket-line activity engaged
in by the body shop workers in that case. That it is unwise to rely on
165. See, e.g., Union News Co. v. Hildreth, 295 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1961).
166. It is also possible that greater clarity might affect party willingness to arbitrate, but the
motives behind refusing to arbitrate are sufficiently varied that one is hesitant to put that justifica-
tion forward.
The need for certainty in this area should not be thought of as equivalent to the need for
certainty of substantive Board doctrine. The Board's view of what does and does not violate § 7 is
likely to have an effect on day-to-day conduct of the workplace. Since an adjective doctrine such
as the deferral policy is going to come into play only after an alleged violation of contract and
statute has taken place, it is less likely to have such an impact.
167. Roy Robinson Chevrolet, 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1477.
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section numbers is also made clear in Douglas Aircraft Co.,168 a recent
Spielberg case. Adthough that case arose under section 8(a)(3), the rea-
sons given for not deferring were clearly the same reasons that were
given in Filmation, a section 8(a)(4) case.
To a degree, the difficulty in achieving certainty of application of
deferral doctrines is a result of the informality of prehearing proce-
dures in Board cases. There is no discovery in the ordinary sense, rela-
tively little exchange of information, and no opportunity for the taking
of depositions. 69  It is unlikely, however, that the Board will adopt
more formal prehearing procedures. One of the chief complaints
about the National Labor Relations Board is that its procedures al-
ready take too long and are unduly cumbersome and technical. The
addition of formal prehearing discovery would create more potential
for delay and would stretch the Board's already strained resources even
further. Thus, whatever deferral policy is to be developed must rest on
the assumption that deferral decisions will be made on the basis of the
award, opinion, and whatever documentation-such as transcripts,
copies of briefs, and the like-may be available at the time the general
counsel issues a complaint. Only if that written record is unusually
complete will it be possible in most instances to avoid the need for an
administrative hearing.
Since the Board's doctrines in this area are currently in flux, the
temptation to ask for a "second bite" is unusually strong; one must
anticipate a possible increase in the number of matters brought to the
Board following an outcome in arbitration adverse to the interests of
the charging party. Similarly, in Collyer cases one would readily
anticipate a use by many charging parties of the device of listing sec-
tion 8(a)(3) on the charge form in addition to a listing of section 8(a)(5).
Perhaps the most regrettable aspect of General American
Transportation, in retrospect, is that the Board chose not to adopt the
very thoughtful and specific guidelines developed for use by the re-
gional offices in the revised Nash memorandum. 70 Virtually all the
factors that have been discussed in the previous paragraphs of this sec-
168. 234 N.L.R.B. No. 80, 97 L.R.R.M. 1242 (Jan. 31, 1978).
169. In Douglas Aircraft, the respondent and the union attempted to provide additional infor-
mation with respect to the nature of the arbitrator's decision by holding a "clarification hearing"
in the arbitration case. The majority opinion of the Board simply states: "This Board will not
sanction and defer to such a prejudicial procedure." Precisely what aspect of the clarification
hearing was prejudicial is not stated. Id. at -, 97 L.R.R.M. at 1244.
170. General Counsel Memorandum, Arbitration Deferral Policy Under Collyer-Revised
Guidelines, May 10, 1973, 83 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 41 (1973).
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tion are treated in that memorandum, and while it is possible to differ
with the resolution of each problem by Mr. Nash, the analysis of sub-
stantive principle and procedural devices are, to this reader, infinitely
clearer and easier to follow than those in the General American
Transportation opinions. At present, regional offices of the Board must
now operate under a directive that includes these bemusing
paragraphs:
(2) If the charge contains meritorious allegations that certain
acts are violative of Section 8(a)(5) and that other acts are violative
of Section 8(a)(1) or (3) and if all of these acts are closely related or
inextricably intertwined, the Region should issue complaint alleging
all violations. Similar policies should be followed with respect to
Section 8(b)(3) allegations which are closely related or inextricably
intertwined with Section 8(b)(2) or 8(b)(1)(A) allegations.
(3) If the charge contains meritorious allegations that certain
acts are violative of Section 8(a)(5) and that other acts are violative
of Section 8(a)(1) or (3), and if the former acts are not closely related
or inextricably intertwined with the latter acts, the Region should
apply the traditional Collyer guidelines to the former allegations and
issue complaint on the latter allegations. A similar policy should be
followed as to charges which allege 8(b)(3) allegations and 8(b)(2) or
8(b)(1)(A) allegations.' 7 '
One must sympathize with the statement by the distinguished edi-
tor of one of the loose-leaf reporting services in the labor relations field
who recently told a group of attorneys and labor and management rep-
resentatives: "I simply don't think it is possible to know at present
when the Board will and will not defer to anything."' 72
I Integrity and Credibility of Board Actions
It is obvious that as a matter of internal concern, the Board must
maintain a high level of credibility among workers in order for its
processes to be taken seriously. The Board is therefore appropriately
concerned with retaining maximum opportunity to make decisions on
whether its processes have been abused, its name and power appropri-
ated to improper private use, or whether access to its procedures may
have been interfered with. It is for this reason that the Board has
decided not to defer under Collyer in 8(a)(4) cases, and this underlying
concern is surely the rationale for the Filmation and Douglas Aircraft
decisions in the Spielberg area.
171. Office of the General Counsel, Memorandum 77-58, supra note 44, at 153-54.
172. The statement was not intended for attribution, but the present writer will attest to its
having been made in early March 1978 and to its being greeted with loud and lengthy applause.
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It would seem, nevertheless, that it is possible for the Board to take
better advantage of the arbitration process even in cases of this sort,
though one must concur in the Board's judgment that outright deferral
in such matters will rarely be appropriate.
III. PROPOSALS FOR CLARIFICATION
Any suggestions for the content of a more rational accommodation
of NLRB and arbitral processes must take into account not only the
criteria developed above, but also the decisions of the ultimate arbiter
of national labor policy, the Supreme Court. The Court has never in-
structed the NLRB, as it has the lower federal courts, to give way so
that an arbitrator can render the initial decision in a dispute. Nor has
the Court denied the existence of the Board's power to defer in proper
cases.173 There are, nevertheless, a few principles that may be derived
from major court decisions that are clearly relevant to this problem: (1)
the responsibilities of the National Labor Relations Board and those of
arbitrators overlap; 74 (2) arbitrators possess a special expertise in the
interpretation of collective bargaining agreements and are skilled in ap-
plying those agreements to the circumstances of industrial practice;
75
(3) National Labor Relations Board deferral doctrine should not be
viewed as an election of remedies concept;176 (4) the cornerstone inter-
est protected by the National Labor Relations Act is individualfreedom
of association; 77 (5) the maintenance of order in the industrial commu-
nity requires that certain individual freedoms, such as the right of an
individual employee to protest employer decisions on hiring practices,
be restricted so the employer can handle such matters through negotia-
tions and arbitrations with a recognized bargaining agent; 78 (6) the de-
cisions of the bargaining agent in negotiation and in the handling of the
grievances must not disregard the fundamental interests of individual
workers; 79 and (7) the therapeutic significance of arbitration is not
173. The Court has spoken favorably of deferral several times, perhaps most strongly in Wil-
1am E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 417 U.S. 12 (1974).
174. C & C Plywood Corp., 148 N.L.R.B. 414 (1964), enforcement denied, 351 F.2d 224 (9th
Cir. 1965), rev'd, 385 U.S. 421 (1967).
175. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Con)., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
176. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
177. NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974).
178. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50
(1975); Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
179. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
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wholly dependent on the binding effect of the resulting decision. 80
There has been a regrettable all-or-nothing quality to some of the
discussion in this area. This is unfortunate, not only because of the
emotional heat occasionally generated, but also because an all-or-noth-
ing view is simply nonsensical: the National Labor Relations Board
cannot give all, because to do so would violate the basic charge en-
trusted to it by the Congress. Accommodation, not abdication, is what
is needed. In the following suggestions, four possible treatments of
arbitral decisions and grievance disputes-settlements processes will be
employed: (1) total disregard of the arbitral decisional forum; (2) treat-
ment of arbitral findings and decisions as evidence; (3) recognition of
an arbitral decision as the final appropriate disposition of a dispute;
and (4) deferral to the arbitral process, by staying Board processes for a
time so that the grievance-settlement procedures provided by contract
may be utilized, despite the objections of one or more parties.
4. The Spielberg Cases
The wisdom of the Spielberg recognition of arbitral decisions is
clear. This doctrine permits the conservation of Board resources, min-
imizes duplication of effort, and raises no difficulty with respect to costs
since the costs of the arbitration have already been incurred and allo-
cated. There are, however, three problems in this area that need to be
addressed.
First is the question of what to do about an arbitral decision once
the Board has decided that it will not recognize the decision as the ulti-
mate disposition of the dispute. The rational alternatives are to disre-
gard the decision or to give the decision weight as evidence. The
opinion in F//mation seems to imply that a majority of the Board will
simply disregard arbitral findings once they have determined recogni-
tion of the award is inappropriate.' 8 ' That is unfortunate, for it de-
tracts from the significance of a dispute-settlement process that carries
the specific endorsement of the Congress in section 203(d) of Taft-Hart-
ley. The better view, surely, would be that practice urged in the
Court's famous footnote 21 to Alexander v. Gardner-Denver:
We adopt no standards as to the weight to be accorded an arbi-
tral decision, since this must be determined in the court's discretion
with regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. Relevant
factors include the existence of provisions in the collective-bargain-
180. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964).
181. See 227 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1471.
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ing agreement that conform substantially with Title VII, the degree
of procedural fairness in the arbitral forum, adequacy of the record
with respect to the issue of discrimination, and the special compe-
tence of particular arbitrators. Where an arbitral determination
gives full consideration to an employee's Title VII rights, a court may
properly accord it great weight. This is especially true where the
issue is solely one of fact, specifically addressed by the parties and
decided by the arbitrator on the basis of an adequate record. But
courts should ever be mindful that Congress, in enacting Title VII,
thought it necessary to provide a judical forum for the ultimate reso-
lution of discriminatory employment claims. It is the duty of courts
to assure the full availability of this forum.
182
By leaving open the possibility that arbitral findings of fact and inter-
pretations of the contract will be given great weight in later Board pro-
ceedings, the Board would encourage the parties to enter the
arbitration forum fully prepared to give maximum effort to the disposi-
tion of the matter in that forum. Surely this would be in keeping with
the therapeutic objectives described by the Supreme Court in Carey.
18 3
Second, with passage of time it has become increasingly clear that
very few scope-of-unit representation matters are presented to arbitral
forums in such a way that recognition of the resultant award as disposi-
tive can be appropriate. Accordingly, the Board's ordinary course of
action should be to treat arbitral opinions in these matters as evidence
and to give the arbitral findings such weight as may be justified in light
of the factors listed in the Gardner-Denver footnote.
Third, because of the importance of freedom of association rights
in the statutory scheme, the Banyard and Stephenson opinions merit
careful consideration by the Board in these disputes. After all, it should
not be difficult to make a prima facie demonstration of arbitrator ex-
pertise through a showing of past education, experience, or appoint-
ment to a Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service or American
Arbitration Association panel. Demonstrating that the arbitrator con-
sidered the charge that an employee was singled out for special treat-
ment because of his union sympathies will clearly be much more
difficult in the case of decisions without written opinions. In particu-
lar, it would be difficult, though not impossible, to demonstrate this if
the grievance has been settled prior to the arbitration stage. Many
cases will involve written opinions, but even for those that do not, there
may nonetheless be a written record of some sort, including the griev-
182. 415 U.S. at 60 n.21.
183. 375 U.S. at 272.
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ance itself, a statement of the disposition of the grievance at each stage
of the proceedings, and possibly a submission to the arbitral forum.
This means putting a premium on formality in the grievance-settlement
procedure, even though one of the perceived advantages of such sys-
tems is their relative lack of formality. When one balances that per-
ceived advantage against the importance of the interests involved,
however, the better view would seem to be that the Board should recog-
nize grievance-settlement decisions as binding only if it can be demon-
strated that the right to free association has been given specific
protection. With respect to other matters, the Banyard and Stephenson
requirements seem superfluous. The bargaining agent can waive its
bargaining privileges, should it choose to do so, unless such a waiver
violates the duty of fair representation. There is nothing shocking,
therefore, about requiring that a union raise its full set of arguments at
the arbitration forum, or be held to have waived them in non-associa-
tional-freedom cases.
B. Dubo Cases
The rationale underlying the Dubo case is in some way similar to
that involved in Carey. Even if the parties' disputes may not be fully
resolved through the arbitration proceeding, it is wise to let the "ther-
apy" of arbitration take place; and clearly it is appropriate to en-
courage this by delaying Board activity for a time. Therefore, unless a
case involves circumstances that would lead to requesting a 10(j) in-
junction, the present Board attitude of restraint is appropriate.
C. Collyer Cases
Can these cases be satisfactorily resolved by slight modification of
the Dubo doctrine? In Spielberg cases, arbitration has already been
completed on a voluntary basis. In Dubo cases, the process is already
under way, either because the parties have commenced the process vol-
untarily or, as in Dubo itself, because there is a court order requiring
that the process be continued. In Collyer cases, on the other hand, the
impact of deferral is to require a party to go to arbitration who does not
wish to. In many instances, of course, it would be possible for the
respondent in a Collyer situation to have gone into a federal district
court to obtain an order requiring arbitration. In other instances,
going into court would not be possible because of the expiration of time
limits or other similar technical deficiencies in the request for arbitra-
tion. This obviously raises the possibility that the Board might con-
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sider a policy under which it would stay its hand in those cases in
which it would be possible for a party to obtain a court order enforcing
an arbitration agreement. In that way, Colyer cases would be handled
essentially by an extension of the Dubo principle. Unfortunately, the
apparent simplicity of that approach is deceptive. The Board would
soon find itself trying to "second guess" arbitrability decisions made by
the courts, and would find itself involved in technical constructions of
arbitration agreements that could be both difficult and time consuming.
Moreover, that approach would not reflect most of the policy judg-
ments outlined above.
. In discussing Board policy, it is important to remember that in all
likelihood there will continue to be considerable activity by regional
offices encouraging the parties to work out their own problems even
when formal deferral would not be appropriate. Because the decision to
withhold a complaint is not reviewable, there could thus develop a gap
between Board policy and regional office practice. It is unlikely, how-
ever, that this will happen. Both former General Counsel Nash and
present General Counsel Irving have been very sensitive to problems of
Board-arbitrator overlap and have provided the regional offices with
memoranda setting out guidelines that should have the effect not only
of promoting uniformity among the front offices but also of ensuring
that the informal practices of those offices reflect the general counsel's
understanding of Board attitudes.
8 4
While the reasoning in General American Transportation and in
Roy Robinson has been criticized occasionally in this essay, the emerg-
ing thrust of these recent decisions is sound. The underlying position
being taken is that the right of individual workers to freedom of associ-
ation is of such importance that the Board should not stay its processes
in order to require those rights to be adjudicated in a private forum.
There are, however, several reasons why these cases may cause
difficulty.
First, one can envision the situation in which a single discharged
employee wishes to press forward with arbitration of his claim that he
was wrongfully dismissed, but the union, perhaps because of costs, does
not want to go forward, preferring to leave the matter to the Board. In
such cases, when the group interest is minimal and the individual inter-
est strong, there is no justification for either a court or the Board to
184. See Office of General Counsel, Memorandum 77-58, supra note 44 (General Counsel
Irving); General Counsel Memorandum, Arbitration Deferral Policy Under Collyer-Revised
Guidelines, May 10, 1973, supra note 170 (former General Counsel Nash).
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require the union to proceed, unless the union's refusal to proceed vio-
lates its duty of fair representation. On the other hand, if it is the judg-
ment of the grievant that proceeding quickly is better than waiting for
the Board to handle the matter, then the policies underlying section
9(c)185 would indicate that the Board should consider giving this judg-
ment effect. If the respondent-employer is willing to arbitrate the mat-
ter and the grievant is willing to provide the funding for the
presentation of his own case, then deferral would seem appropriate un-
less the union is able to demonstrate that arbitration is a totally unsuit-
able forum.
Second, it is unfortunate that the opinions in these cases are writ-
ten so often in terms of subsections. The same conduct can violate
several sections of the Act, or conduct violative of one section may be
intertwined with conduct violative of another. Surely, the important
point is not what section number happens to be selected at the time a
charge is filed, when the full range and complexity of the case may not
yet be understood. Rather, the focus should be on the issues of indi-
vidual freedom of association or of Board integrity and credibility that
are raised in the case. These opinions should be read to require that
the Board not defer in cases involving these issues, whatever the adven-
titious selection of section number may have been.
Finally, one hopes that the Board will soon resolve any apparent
inconsistencies between its own view of waiver of the right to bargain
and the view held by arbitrators. The Board and arbitrators are now
somewhat more likely to take similar views of what decisions are inher-
ently those of management, but when one turns to the issue of waiver,
whether the two forums will agree remains doubtful. If this is indeed
the case, then the propriety of deferral in such cases is likewise
doubtful.
Such modest emendations of the doctrines developed in the recent
cases is surely not too much to hope for. The ingredients for these
changes are already present in the divergent views of the members of
the Board. The most recent appointee is a person with Board experi-
ence who is likely to prove sensitive to the legitimate claims of each
forum because of his past experience in dealing administratively with
Collyer problems.
The ease with which these adjustments could be made is best
demonstrated by articulating them in the form of a relatively
185. National Labor Relations Act § 9(c), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1970).
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comprehensive set of "rules" on Board grievance procedure accommo-
dation. The four suggested rules reflect the balancing of interests set
out in the prior discussion. Rule I is limited to determinations made
by neutrals, and is based on the Gardner-Denver opinion. Rule II is a
restatement of the Spielberg doctrine, modified to take into account the
primacy of freedom of association rights and the Board's responsibility
to protect its own processes. Since the freedom of association cases
would not be entitled to recognition, the balance of value calls for re-
jecting the Banyard rule. It is important to remember that if recogni-
tion is not available under Rule II, evidentiary weight can still be given
under Rule I. Rule III is a restatement of the Dubo doctrine, making
explicit its inapplicability in cases in which the Board would ordinarily
seek preliminary injunctive relief. Rule IV adopts the outcome of Gen-
eral American Transportation, but modifies it to allow an individual
employee to choose between the more rapid arbitral resolution of a
grievance and the less costly (in out-of-pocket terms) Board resolution
when only the individual's rights are involved.
A SUGGESTED DOCTRINE FOR ACCOMMODATION
Rule I
A. The National Labor Relations Board will admit as evidence in un-
fair labor practice cases determinations of issues relevant to such
cases made in contractually provided grievance systems, if:
(1) the determination is in writing; and
(2) the determination was made by a neutral(s) (whether desig-
nated as arbitrator, umpire, referee or other title) or by a
board chaired by a neutral.
B. The weight to be accorded such a determination depends upon:
(1) the specificity and clarity of the determination;
(2) the regularity of the procedures employed;
(3) the education, training and experience of the neutral(s) mak-
ing the determination; and
(4) the extent to which the determination was made on the basis
of doctrine developed by this Board.
Rule II
A. The National Labor Relations Board will recognize as final and
binding the resolution of a dispute by a grievance-settlement proc-
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ess when the dispute arguably involves both questions of contrac-
tual and National Labor Relations Act statutory interpretation if-
(1) the parties had agreed to be bound by the resolution;
(2) the procedures employed in the process were fair and regular;
(3) the resolution of the dispute is not repugnant to the purposes
and policies of the National Labor Relations Act; and
(4) the dispute does not involve to any significant degree the ex-
ercise by employees of the rights of freedom of association,
nor the integrity and accessibility of the Board's procedures.
B. A party who wishes to have the Board recognize an award makes
out a prima facie case for such recognition upon a showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that:
(1) there is an agreement providing for resolution of grievances
by procedures that afford the charging party or his represen-
tative an opportunity to be heard;
(2) the dispute was of the sort covered by such an agreement; and
(3) the procedures resulted in a resolution of the dispute, includ-
ing disposition of the issue that is the express or implied sub-
ject of the charge(s) before the Board.
C. A party opposing recognition of resolution of the dispute through
grievance procedures must present clear and compelling proof that
one of the standards set out in paragraph A above was not met.
D. If a party who moves for recognition demonstrates that the resolu-
tion of a dispute by the grievance procedures would be entitled to
recognition except for a failure to resolve a particular issue raised
by the charge, the Board will recognize such resolution provided
the moving party proves by clear and compelling evidence that (a)
the undisposed of issue could have been considered in the griev-
ance procedure, and that (b) a party other than the moving party
intentionally omitted to raise that issue. The opposing party,
however, can avoid recognition by demonstrating that there was
adequate justification for failing to raise the issue in the grievance
procedure forum.
Rule III
A. If a charge brought before the Board involves issues substantially
identical to issues currently under submission to a grievance pro-
cedure, and if the parties are continuing to seek resolution of the
issue through such a procedure, either voluntarily or as the result
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of a court order, the Board will withhold consideration of the issue
pending outcome of the grievance procedure.
B. The Board will not withhold consideration of an issue with regard
to which it is the Board's obligation to seek relief under section 10,
subsections (j), (k), or (1),186 of the National Labor Relations Act.
Rule IV
A. A respondent charged with commission of an unfair labor practice
may move that the Board withhold consideration of one or more
issues involved in that charge on the ground that such issue may
properly be resolved through an existing grievance procedure.
The Board will grant such motion if:
(1) the charge does not involve significant issues of the rights of
employees to freedom of association or of the integrity or
availability of Board processes, and
(2) the movant demonstrates that
(a) the grievance procedures are provided for by an agree-
ment between an employer and a representative of em-
ployees who have engaged in bargaining for a
significant period;
(b) the grievance procedures appear to be fair and regular;
(c) the issue is one that falls within the range of issues sub-
ject to such grievance procedures; and
(d) the movant waives his privilege to object to such proce-
dural irregularities as failure to file a grievance within
the proper time.
B. In making the determination whether a given issue is subject to
resolution through a grievance-settlement procedure, the Board
will apply the standards developed in the federal courts pursuant
to the decision in United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp.
C. If the Board would grant a motion to withhold its consideration
but for the fact that an issue of freedom of association is presented,
the Board will grant the motion if the movant shows that the af-
fected employee(s) desires that the matter be resolved through the
grievance system, and that they are willing to assume the responsi-
bility for pursuing the issue in that forum. The privilege of bar-
186. National Labor Relations Act § 10()-(1), 29 U.S.C. § 160(G)-O) (1970).
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gaining representatives to participate pursuant to section 9(a)1s7
must be preserved in such cases.
D. The Board will not withhold consideration of any issue with re-
gard to which it is the Board's obligation to seek relief under sec-
tion 10, subsections (j), (k), or (1), of the National Labor Relations
Act.
E. The Board will retain jurisdiction of any matter in respect of which
a motion to withhold consideration is granted, in order to deter-
mine whether the standards set out in Rule II have been met.
F. Only in the most exceptional circumstances will the Board stay its
procedures for a period exceeding 180 days.
None of the rules incorporates an election of remedies doctrine,
but Rules I, II and III implicitly recognize that significant savings in
cost are possible if the initial decision on an issue is reasonably likely to
be final. Repugnancy is dealt with primarily in terms of burden of
proof, in Rule II, paragraphs B and C. The closest issue in these rules
is whether Rule II, paragraph B, is appropriate when there has been no
participation by a neutral party. Since recognition is not afforded by
Rule II in freedom of association cases, however, bipartite resolution
through the grievance process seems so nearly akin to bargaining that
the rule stated seems sensible. If freedom of association cases remain
the subject of outright recognition under Spielberg, then the party seek-
ing recognition should carry the burden of showing consistency of reso-
lution with Board doctrine, and the Banyard doctrine should be
adopted.
187. National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
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